Monte Carlo simulations of a game-theoretic model for the legal exemption system of the European cartel law are implemented in order to estimate the (mean) deterrent effect of this system. The input and output parameters of the simulated cartel opportunities can be visualized by three-dimensional projections. A description of the model is given in Moritz et al. (2018) <doi:10.1515/bejeap-2017-0235>.
|Author||Martin Becker [aut, cre] (<https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2336-9751>)|
|Maintainer||Martin Becker <firstname.lastname@example.org>|
|License||GPL (>= 2)|
|Package repository||View on CRAN|
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