suffocation: suffocation Bayesian Network
In bnRep: A Repository of Bayesian Networks from the Academic Literature
suffocation R Documentation
suffocation Bayesian Network
Description
Human-related hazardous events assessment for suffocation on ships by integrating Bayesian network and complex network.
Format
A Gaussian Bayesian network to investigate the human-related factors associated with suffocation on ships during docking repair. The probabilities were given within the referenced paper. The vertices are:
- N4
The safety supervisor on board the ship did not perceive the unsafe actions of the operators and failed to correct the inappropriate operations;
- N5
The representative of the ship owner was absent during the operation;
- N8
Nitrogen leakage
- N10
The safety management department of the shipyard failed to strictly implement all safety measures during the holiday season;
- N11
The safety management department of the shipyard did not attach great importance to the safety of the operation on site, and the safety issues were not paid much attention;
- N12
The quality management system in the safety management department was found be defective in the aspect of the required process guidance documents;
- N13
The shipyard failed to effectively supervise the operators on site to strictly implement the safety management system and the operation instruction;
- N14
The safety management department of the shipyard did not strictly implement the safety management regulations - there was no confirmation of the key operation;
- N16
The superintendent of the civil marine project failed to effectively supervise the issues in risk prevention;
- N17
The managers and officers in the civil marine project failed to pay much attention to the preventive measures in the field of safety when formulating the operation plan;
- N18
The superintendent of the civil marine project did not eliminate the potential dangers for the common operation in time;
- N20
The nitrogen accumulated in the enclosed space on site;
- N22
The person in charge of the operation on site did not implement safety-related regulations, such as confirmation, lighting, and supervision;
- N23
The person in charge of the operation on site failed to give input on the operation environment and provide caution to the operators;
- N24
The person in charge of the on-site operation did not confirm the ventilation;
- N25
The operators on site did not implement the required risk-prevention measures for the operation in the limited space;
- N26
The operator on site did not apply for a permit for the operation procedures;
- N27
The person in charge of the operation on site failed to check the operation permit in the limited space before the operation;
- N28
The person in charge of the operation on site did not confirm the implementation of gas detection;
- N29
The person in charge of the operation on site did not effectively perform their designated responsibility during the operation;
- N30
The work associated with risk identification before the operation was not performed by the person in charge of the operation;
- N32
The removing of the U pipe containing nitrogen in the enclosed space is usually characterized by high risk, which was not did not receive due attention from the operators on site;
- N33
The risk-prevention measures applicable for the enclosed space were not in place before the operation, and various potential risks were not effectively identified;
- N34
The process guidance documents for the officers in the general assembly department were absent;
- N35
The officers in the general assembly department failed to identify all the risks associated with the temporary operation;
- N36
The officers in the general assembly department failed to implement the safety-related measures designed for the holiday season;
- N37
The person on duty in the general assembly department did not perform their responsibilities effectively;
- N38
The officers in the general assembly department failed to implement the safety training for the temporary operators in relation to operative environments and the potential risks;
- N39
The officers in the general assembly department did not effectively perform their supervision and risk monitoring responsibilities;
- N40
Most of the people involved in the accident were found to have low awareness of the safety-related issues during the May 1st Labor Day;
- UA
Unsafe acts;
- UP
Precondition for unsafe acts;
- US
Unsafe supervision;
- OI
Organizational influence;
- PersonnelSuffocation
Value
An object of class bn.fit. Refer to the documentation of bnlearn for details.
References
Qiao, W., Guo, H., Huang, E., Deng, W., Lian, C., & Chen, H. (2022). Human-Related Hazardous Events Assessment for Suffocation on Ships by Integrating Bayesian Network and Complex Network. Applied Sciences, 12(14), 6905.
bnRep documentation built on April 12, 2025, 1:13 a.m.
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| suffocation | R Documentation |
suffocation Bayesian Network
Description
Human-related hazardous events assessment for suffocation on ships by integrating Bayesian network and complex network.
Format
A Gaussian Bayesian network to investigate the human-related factors associated with suffocation on ships during docking repair. The probabilities were given within the referenced paper. The vertices are:
- N4
The safety supervisor on board the ship did not perceive the unsafe actions of the operators and failed to correct the inappropriate operations;
- N5
The representative of the ship owner was absent during the operation;
- N8
Nitrogen leakage
- N10
The safety management department of the shipyard failed to strictly implement all safety measures during the holiday season;
- N11
The safety management department of the shipyard did not attach great importance to the safety of the operation on site, and the safety issues were not paid much attention;
- N12
The quality management system in the safety management department was found be defective in the aspect of the required process guidance documents;
- N13
The shipyard failed to effectively supervise the operators on site to strictly implement the safety management system and the operation instruction;
- N14
The safety management department of the shipyard did not strictly implement the safety management regulations - there was no confirmation of the key operation;
- N16
The superintendent of the civil marine project failed to effectively supervise the issues in risk prevention;
- N17
The managers and officers in the civil marine project failed to pay much attention to the preventive measures in the field of safety when formulating the operation plan;
- N18
The superintendent of the civil marine project did not eliminate the potential dangers for the common operation in time;
- N20
The nitrogen accumulated in the enclosed space on site;
- N22
The person in charge of the operation on site did not implement safety-related regulations, such as confirmation, lighting, and supervision;
- N23
The person in charge of the operation on site failed to give input on the operation environment and provide caution to the operators;
- N24
The person in charge of the on-site operation did not confirm the ventilation;
- N25
The operators on site did not implement the required risk-prevention measures for the operation in the limited space;
- N26
The operator on site did not apply for a permit for the operation procedures;
- N27
The person in charge of the operation on site failed to check the operation permit in the limited space before the operation;
- N28
The person in charge of the operation on site did not confirm the implementation of gas detection;
- N29
The person in charge of the operation on site did not effectively perform their designated responsibility during the operation;
- N30
The work associated with risk identification before the operation was not performed by the person in charge of the operation;
- N32
The removing of the U pipe containing nitrogen in the enclosed space is usually characterized by high risk, which was not did not receive due attention from the operators on site;
- N33
The risk-prevention measures applicable for the enclosed space were not in place before the operation, and various potential risks were not effectively identified;
- N34
The process guidance documents for the officers in the general assembly department were absent;
- N35
The officers in the general assembly department failed to identify all the risks associated with the temporary operation;
- N36
The officers in the general assembly department failed to implement the safety-related measures designed for the holiday season;
- N37
The person on duty in the general assembly department did not perform their responsibilities effectively;
- N38
The officers in the general assembly department failed to implement the safety training for the temporary operators in relation to operative environments and the potential risks;
- N39
The officers in the general assembly department did not effectively perform their supervision and risk monitoring responsibilities;
- N40
Most of the people involved in the accident were found to have low awareness of the safety-related issues during the May 1st Labor Day;
- UA
Unsafe acts;
- UP
Precondition for unsafe acts;
- US
Unsafe supervision;
- OI
Organizational influence;
- PersonnelSuffocation
Value
An object of class bn.fit. Refer to the documentation of bnlearn for details.
References
Qiao, W., Guo, H., Huang, E., Deng, W., Lian, C., & Chen, H. (2022). Human-Related Hazardous Events Assessment for Suffocation on Ships by Integrating Bayesian Network and Complex Network. Applied Sciences, 12(14), 6905.
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