Gale_Shapley | R Documentation |
This code allows the self-matched option
Gale_Shapley(U, V, return.data.frame = FALSE, cpp = TRUE, nmax = 10 * nrow(U))
U |
The utility matrix for the women's side. Each row is a woman, each column is a man.
The matrix entry (i,j) is the utility that woman |
V |
The utility matrix for the men's side. Each column is a man, each row is a woman.
The matrix entry (i,j) is the utility that man |
return.data.frame |
logical Should a |
cpp |
logical Should the |
nmax |
count The maximum number of iterations of the inner loop within the Gale-Shapley algorithm. This can be reduced to speed up the algorithm at the potential cost of many partnerships being non-equilibruim. |
The function return depends on the return.data.frame
value.
If TRUE, it returns
data.frame |
a two-column |
If FALSE, it returns the following matrix:
mu |
If |
Goyal, Shuchi; Handcock, Mark S.; Jackson, Heide M.; Rendall, Michael S. and Yeung, Fiona C. (2023). A Practical Revealed Preference Model for Separating Preferences and Availability Effects in Marriage Formation, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, A. \Sexpr[results=rd]{tools:::Rd_expr_doi("10.1093/jrsssa/qnad031")}
Dagsvik, John K. (2000) Aggregation in Matching Markets International Economic Review, Vol. 41, 27-57. JSTOR: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2648822, \Sexpr[results=rd]{tools:::Rd_expr_doi("10.1111/1468-2354.00054")}
Menzel, Konrad (2015). Large Matching Markets as Two-Sided Demand Systems Econometrica, Vol. 83, No. 3 (May, 2015), 897-941. \Sexpr[results=rd]{tools:::Rd_expr_doi("10.3982/ECTA12299")}
rpm
Add the following code to your website.
For more information on customizing the embed code, read Embedding Snippets.