sanctionsData: Economic Sanctions Threats and Outcomes

In sigInt: Estimate the Parameters of a Discrete Crisis-Bargaining Game

Description

Dataset on economic sanctions threats and outcomes from 1970-2000

Usage

data(sanctionsData)

Details

These data were compiled using the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES), data project (Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi 2014), with additional data from the Correlates of War (COW), and Polity IV datasets. See Crisman-Cox and Gibilisco (2018) for more information. The unit of observation is the dyad-decade, and the variables are:

gameID

A dyad-decade identifier composed of COW country codes and the decade observed.

dyadID

A dyad identifier composed of COW country codes

tenyear

The observed decade

code1

Challenger's COW code

code2

Target's COW code

sq

The number of status quo observations in this dyad decade

cd

The number of times that the game ends with Challenge-Concede (Outcome CD)

sf

The number of times that the game ends with Challenge-Resist -Stand Firm (Outcome SF)

bd

The number of times that the game ends with Challenge-Resist-Back Down (Outcome BD)

senderecondep

Challenger's economic dependence (dyadic trade / Challenger's GDP per capita)

senderdemocracy

Challenger's Polity score

contig

Contiguity between states

ally

Are these state allied? (indicator)

anticipatedsendercosts

The Challenger's anticipated costs for enacting sanctions

anticipatedtargetcosts

The Target's anticipated costs for being sanctions

targetecondep

Target's economic dependence (dyadic trade / Target's GDP per capita)

lncaprat

Ratio of the Challenger's military capability to the Target's (logged)

targetdemocracy

Target's Polity score

PRhat

Estimated probability that the Target resists a challenge (fit using a random forest)

PFhat

Estimated probability that the Challenger stands firm given that it challenged (fit using a random forest)

PRnpl

Estimated probability that the Target resists a challenge (taken from the last stage of NPL iteration)

PFnpl

Estimated probability that the Challenger stands firm given that it challenged (taken from the last stage of NPL iteration)

References

Barbieri, Katherine, Omar M. G. Keshk, and Brian Pollins. 2009. "TRADING DATA: Evaluating our Assumptions and Coding Rules." Conflict Management and Peace Science. 26(5): 471-491.

Casey Crisman-Cox and Michael Gibilisco. 2018. "Estimating Signaling Games in International Relations: Problems and Solutions." Unpublished Manuscript.

Gibler, Douglas M. 2009. International military alliances, 1648-2008. CQ Press.

Marshall, Monty G., and Keith Jaggers. 2013. "Polity IV Project." http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.

Morgan, T. Clifton, Navin Bapat, and Yoshi Kobayashi. 2014. "The Threat and Imposition of Sanctions: Updating the TIES dataset." Conflict Management and Peace Science 31(5): 541-558.

Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. 1972. "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." in Bruce Russett (ed) Peace, War, and Numbers, Beverly Hills: Sage, 19-48.

Stinnett, Douglas M., Jaroslav Tir, Philip Schafer, Paul F. Diehl, and Charles Gochman. 2002. "The Correlates of War Project Direct Contiguity Data, Version 3." Conflict Management and Peace Science 19(2):58-66.

See Also

sigint

sigInt documentation built on Jan. 11, 2020, 9:20 a.m.