DF2011: Data of Dal Bo and Frechette (2011)
In stratEst: Strategy Estimation
DF2011 R Documentation
Data of Dal Bo and Frechette (2011)
Description
A dataset with observations from the repeated prisoner's dilemma experiment of Dal Bo and Frechette (2011).
Usage
data(DF2011)
Format
A data frame with 7358 rows and 6 variables:
- treatment
A factor with six levels which identifies the treatments of the experiment.
- id
A vector of integers which identifies the participant.
- game
A vector of integers which identifies the supergame.
- period
A vector of integers which identifies the period of the supergame.
- choice
A factor with two levels which is indicates if the participant cooperates (c) or defects (d) in the current period.
- other.choice
A factor with two levels which indicates if the other participant cooperates (c) or defects (d) in the current period.
Source
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.101.1.411
References
Dal Bo P, Frechette GR (2011). "The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence." American Economic Review, 101(1), 411-429.
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| DF2011 | R Documentation |
Data of Dal Bo and Frechette (2011)
Description
A dataset with observations from the repeated prisoner's dilemma experiment of Dal Bo and Frechette (2011).
Usage
data(DF2011)
Format
A data frame with 7358 rows and 6 variables:
- treatment
A factor with six levels which identifies the treatments of the experiment.
- id
A vector of integers which identifies the participant.
- game
A vector of integers which identifies the supergame.
- period
A vector of integers which identifies the period of the supergame.
- choice
A factor with two levels which is indicates if the participant cooperates (c) or defects (d) in the current period.
- other.choice
A factor with two levels which indicates if the other participant cooperates (c) or defects (d) in the current period.
Source
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.101.1.411
References
Dal Bo P, Frechette GR (2011). "The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence." American Economic Review, 101(1), 411-429.
R Package Documentation
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Note that we can't provide technical support on individual packages. You should contact the package authors for that.
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