View source: R/bargaining_tariff.R
bargaining_tariff | R Documentation |
Simulate the effect of tariffs when firms play a Nash Bargaining game and consumer demand is Logit.
bargaining_tariff( demand = c("logit"), prices, shares, margins, owner = NULL, mktElast = NA_real_, insideSize = NA_real_, diversions, tariffPre = rep(0, length(shares)), tariffPost = rep(0, length(shares)), bargpowerPre = rep(0.5, length(prices)), bargpowerPost = bargpowerPre, normIndex = ifelse(isTRUE(all.equal(sum(shares), 1, check.names = FALSE)), 1, NA), priceOutside = ifelse(demand == "logit", 0, 1), priceStart, control.slopes, control.equ, labels = paste("Prod", 1:length(shares), sep = ""), ... )
demand |
A character vector indicating which demand system to use. Currently allows logit (default). |
prices |
A length k vector product prices. |
shares |
A length k vector of product shares. Values must be between 0 and 1. |
margins |
A length k vector of product margins. All margins must be in levels (not w.r.t to price), or NA. |
owner |
EITHER a vector of length k whose values indicate which firm produced a product before the tariff OR a k x k matrix of pre-merger ownership shares. |
mktElast |
A negative number equal to the industry pre-merger price elasticity. Default is NA . |
insideSize |
An integer equal to total pre-merger units sold. If shares sum to one, this also equals the size of the market. |
diversions |
A k x k matrix of diversion ratios with diagonal elements equal to -1. Default is missing, in which case diversion according to revenue share is assumed. |
tariffPre |
A vector of length k where each element equals the current ad valorem tariff (expressed as a proportion of the consumer price) imposed on each product. Default is 0, which assumes no tariff. |
tariffPost |
A vector of length k where each element equals the new ad valorem tariff (expressed as a proportion of the consumer price) imposed on each product. Default is 0, which assumes no tariff. |
bargpowerPre |
A length k vector of pre-tariff bargaining power parameters. Values must be between 0 (sellers have the power) and 1 (buyers the power). NA values are allowed, though must be calibrated from additional margin and share data. Default is 0.5. |
bargpowerPost |
A length k vector of post-tariff bargaining power parameters. Values must be between 0 (sellers have the power) and 1 (buyers the power). NA values are allowed, though must be calibrated from additional margin and share data. Default is ‘bargpowerPre’. |
normIndex |
An integer equalling the index (position) of the inside product whose mean valuation will be normalized to 1. Default is 1, unless ‘shares’ sum to less than 1, in which case the default is NA and an outside good is assumed to exist. |
priceOutside |
price of the outside good. Equals 0 for logit and 1 for ces. Not used for aids. |
priceStart |
For aids, a vector of length k who elements equal to an initial guess of the proportional change in price caused by the merger. The default is to draw k random elements from a [0,1] uniform distribution. For ces and logit, the default is prices. |
control.slopes |
A list of |
control.equ |
A list of |
labels |
A k-length vector of labels. |
... |
Additional options to feed to the |
Let k denote the number of products produced by all firms.
Using price, and quantity, information for all products
in each market, as well as margin information for at least
one products in each market, bargaining_tariff
is able to
recover the slopes and intercepts of a Logit demand
system. These parameters are then used to simulate the price
effects of an ad valorem tariff under the assumption that the firms are playing a
Nash Bargaining game.
bargaining_tariff
returns an instance of class TariffBargainingLogit
Simon P. Anderson, Andre de Palma, Brent Kreider, Tax incidence in differentiated product oligopoly, Journal of Public Economics, Volume 81, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 173-192.
bertrand_tariff
to simulate the effects of a tariff under a Bertrand pricing game and monopolistic_competition_tariff
to simulate the effects of a tariff under monopolistic competition.
## Calibration and simulation results from a 10% tariff on non-US beers "OTHER-LITE" ## and "OTHER-REG" ## Source: Epstein/Rubenfeld 2004, pg 80 prodNames <- c("BUD","OLD STYLE","MILLER","MILLER-LITE","OTHER-LITE","OTHER-REG") owner <-c("BUD","OLD STYLE","MILLER","MILLER","OTHER-LITE","OTHER-REG") price <- c(.0441,.0328,.0409,.0396,.0387,.0497) shares <- c(.066,.172,.253,.187,.099,.223) margins <- c(.3830,.5515,.5421,.5557,.4453,.3769) # margins in terms of price tariff <- c(0,0,0,0,.1,.1) names(price) <- names(shares) <- names(margins) <- prodNames result.barg <- bargaining_tariff(demand = "logit",prices=price,shares=shares, margins = margins,owner=owner, tariffPost = tariff, labels=prodNames) print(result.barg) # return predicted price change summary(result.barg) # summarize merger simulation
Add the following code to your website.
For more information on customizing the embed code, read Embedding Snippets.