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TUvalues-package R Documentation
TUvalues: Tools for Calculating Allocations in Game Theory using Exact and Approximated Methods
Description
The main objective of cooperative Transferable-Utility games (TU-games) is to allocate a good among the agents involved. The package implements major solution concepts including the Shapley value, Banzhaf value, and egalitarian rules, alongside their extensions for structured games: the Owen value and Banzhaf-Owen value for games with a priori unions, and the Myerson value for communication games on networks. To address the inherent exponential computational complexity of exact evaluation, the package offers both exact algorithms and sampling-based approximation methods, enabling the analysis of large-scale games. The characteristic function can be supplied as a vector or as an R function, so that coalition values are evaluated only when required. Additionally, it supports core set-based solutions, allowing computation of the vertices and the centroid of the core and checking whether an allocation belongs to it.
Acknowledgements
This research has been partially supported by Grants PID2021-124030NB-C31,
PID2025-172680NB-I00 and PID2025-170122NB-C32 from MICINN, Spain, and ERDF,
"A way to make Europe", European Union. This research was also partially
supported by the CIGE/2026/47 grant, funded by the Conselleria de
Educación, Cultura, Universidades y Empleo, Generalitat Valenciana.
Author(s)
Maintainer: Maria D. Guillen maria.guilleng@umh.es (ORCID)
Authors:
Juan Carlos Gonçalves jgoncalves@umh.es (ORCID)
Jesús Camacho j.camacho@umh.es (ORCID)
See Also
Useful links:
TUvalues documentation built on Nov. 8, 2026, 1:19 a.m.
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| TUvalues-package | R Documentation |
TUvalues: Tools for Calculating Allocations in Game Theory using Exact and Approximated Methods
Description
The main objective of cooperative Transferable-Utility games (TU-games) is to allocate a good among the agents involved. The package implements major solution concepts including the Shapley value, Banzhaf value, and egalitarian rules, alongside their extensions for structured games: the Owen value and Banzhaf-Owen value for games with a priori unions, and the Myerson value for communication games on networks. To address the inherent exponential computational complexity of exact evaluation, the package offers both exact algorithms and sampling-based approximation methods, enabling the analysis of large-scale games. The characteristic function can be supplied as a vector or as an R function, so that coalition values are evaluated only when required. Additionally, it supports core set-based solutions, allowing computation of the vertices and the centroid of the core and checking whether an allocation belongs to it.
Acknowledgements
This research has been partially supported by Grants PID2021-124030NB-C31, PID2025-172680NB-I00 and PID2025-170122NB-C32 from MICINN, Spain, and ERDF, "A way to make Europe", European Union. This research was also partially supported by the CIGE/2026/47 grant, funded by the Conselleria de Educación, Cultura, Universidades y Empleo, Generalitat Valenciana.
Author(s)
Maintainer: Maria D. Guillen maria.guilleng@umh.es (ORCID)
Authors:
Juan Carlos Gonçalves jgoncalves@umh.es (ORCID)
Jesús Camacho j.camacho@umh.es (ORCID)
See Also
Useful links:
R Package Documentation
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We want your feedback!
Note that we can't provide technical support on individual packages. You should contact the package authors for that.
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