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matchingMarkets: Analysis of Stable Matchings
Implements structural estimators to correct for the sample selection bias from observed outcomes in matching markets. This includes one-sided matching of agents into groups (Klein, 2015) <https://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research-files/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe1521.pdf> as well as two-sided matching of students to schools (Aue et al., 2020) <https://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp20032.pdf>. The package also contains algorithms to find stable matchings in the three most common matching problems: the stable roommates problem (Irving, 1985) <doi:10.1016/0196-6774(85)90033-1>, the college admissions problem (Gale and Shapley, 1962) <doi:10.2307/2312726>, and the house allocation problem (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) <doi:10.1016/0304-4068(74)90033-0>.
Getting started
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Package details |
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| Author | Thilo Klein [aut, cre, cph], Robert Aue [ctb], Fahiem Bacchus [cph], Sven Giegerich [ctb], Matthias Hericks [ctb], Alexander Sauer [ctb], Niklas Sorensson [cph] |
| Maintainer | Thilo Klein <thilo@klein.uk> |
| License | GPL (>= 2) |
| Version | 1.0-4 |
| URL | https://matchingMarkets.org https://klein.uk |
| Package repository | View on CRAN |
| Installation |
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