matchingMarkets: Analysis of Stable Matchings

Implements structural estimators to correct for the sample selection bias from observed outcomes in matching markets. This includes one-sided matching of agents into groups as well as two-sided matching of students to schools. The package also contains algorithms to find stable matchings in the three most common matching problems: the stable roommates problem, the college admissions problem, and the house allocation problem.

Package details

AuthorThilo Klein [aut, cre], Robert Aue [ctb], Sven Giegerich [ctb], Alexander Sauer [ctb]
MaintainerThilo Klein <[email protected]>
LicenseGPL (>= 2)
Package repositoryView on CRAN
Installation Install the latest version of this package by entering the following in R:

Try the matchingMarkets package in your browser

Any scripts or data that you put into this service are public.

matchingMarkets documentation built on Feb. 5, 2019, 1:04 a.m.