Seniors: Intergenerationals Experiments

In pder: Panel Data Econometrics with R

Description

a pseudo-panel of 159 Individuals

number of observations : 2703

number of individual observations : 17

country : France

package : panellimdep

JEL codes: C90, J14, J26, M12, M51

Chapter : 08

Usage

data(Seniors)

Format

A dataframe containing:

id

individual number of each subject

period

from 1 to 17

session

from 1 to 12

firm

1 if working subject, 0 otherwise

firmx

1 if the firm is X, 0 if the firm is Y

order

1 if the treatment with no information on the generation of the group is played first in the Public Good game, 0 otherwise

gender

1 if male subject, 0 if female subject

manager

1 if the subject is a manager, 0 otherwise

student

1 if the subject is a student, 0 otherwise

retir

1 if retiree, 0 otherwise

senior

1 if the subject is a senior, 0 otherwise

seniord

1 if the subject reports s/he is a senior, 0 if junior

workingsenior

1 if the subject is a working senior, 0 otherwise

workingjunior

1 if the subject is a working junior, 0 otherwise

information

1 if information is given on the generation composition of the group, 0 otherwise

nbseniors

number of seniors in the group, excluding the subject

homogend

1 if the group is homogenous in terms of declared generation, 0 otherwise

homodgenck

1 if the group is homogenous in terms of declared generation and this is common information, 0 otherwise

contribution

amount of the contribution to the public good (from 0 to 20)

pot

amount of the public good (from 0 to 60)

potlag

amount of the public good in the previous period (from 0 to 60)

potimean

amount of the public good, excluding the subject's contribution (from 0 to 40)

potimeanlag

amount of the public good in the previous period, excluding the subject's contribution (from 0 to 40)

payoffpggame

payoff in the public good game

desirnbseniors

desired number of seniors co-participants in the Selection treatment (from 0 to 2)

invest

amount invested in the risky lotery

payoffriskgame

payoff in the investment game

letters

1 if letters are A M F U R I P , 0 if they are OATFNED

idicompet

individual number of the co-participant in the Task game

seniordopponent

1 if the co-participant in the Task game reports s/he is a senior, 0 otherwise

seniori

1 if the co-participant in the Task game is a senior

option

1 if the subject has chosen the tournament, 0 otherwise

option0

1 if the co-participant has chosen the tournament, 0 otherwise

twoperstour

1 if both participants have chosen the tournament, 0 otherwise

beliefself

number of words the subject believes s/he will create

beliefseniors

number of words the subject believes the seniors will create on average

beliefjuniors

number of words the subject believes the juniors will create on average

beliefsmatchs

number of words the subject believes the seniors will create on average when matched with a senior

beliefjmatchj

number of words the subject believes the juniors will create on average when matched with a junior

relatabil

1 if the subject believes s/he can create more words than the generation of his/her co-participant, 0 otherwise

performance

number of words actually created

perfi

number of words actually created by the co-participant

payoffcompetitiongame

payoff in the Task game

expesenck

1 if the subject has been informed that s/he was interacting with seniors in the Public Good game, 0 otherwise

potlagsenior

Amount of the pot in the previous period * the subject is a senior

heterogend

1 if the group mixes the two generations, 0 otherwise

Source

American Economic Association Data Archive : https://www.aeaweb.org/aer/

References

Charness, Gary and Marie-Claire Villeval (2009) “Cooperation and Competition in Intergenerational Experiments in the Field and the Laboratory”, American Economic Review, 99(3), 956–978, doi: 10.1257/aer.99.3.956 .

pder documentation built on Jan. 27, 2022, 1:12 a.m.