R/all_democracy_scores_documentation.R
In xmarquez/QuickUDS: Extend the Unified Democracy Scores easily
#' All Democracy Scores Dataset
#'
#' A dataset containing all (or nearly all) extant democracy indexes.
#'
#' @section Overview:
#'
#' This dataset contains most democracy indexes in use today in a single panel
#' (country-year) file. It attempts to be as comprehensive as possible,
#' incorporating rarely used democracy indexes not easily available in
#' country-year format.
#'
#' The measurement of democracy is complicated and controversial. This dataset
#' makes few judgments about what counts as a measure of democracy, as long as
#' it has been used in scholarly work. It thus includes dichotomous,
#' trichotomous, ordinal, and continuous indices; indices that focus primarily
#' on the "competition" and indices that focus on the "participation"
#' dimension of democracy; "thick" indices that attempt to measure a wide
#' variety of characteristics plausibly attributed to democracy; and
#' "minimalist" indexes that restrict themselves to the bare minimum of
#' competition. Four broad families of democracy measures can be
#' distinguished:
#'
#' @section Dichotomous indexes of democracy:
#'
#' These are indexes designed to distinguish between democracy and
#' non-democracy. Most of them follow a fairly minimalist conception of
#' democracy, focused on political competition while giving little weight to
#' the extent of the suffrage or thicker civil or economic rights. These
#' include the Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2012) indicator of democracy
#' (`bmr_democracy`, `bmr_democracy_omitteddata`, and
#' `bmr_democracy_femalesuffrage`); the Bernhard, Nordstrom and Reenock index
#' of democracy (\code{bnr} and `bnr_extended`), originally developed for
#' event history analysis (Bernhard, Nordstrom, and Reenock 2001); Renske
#' Doorenspleet's indicator of democracy (\code{doorenspleet}), based on the
#' Polity III data and a measure of the extent of suffrage (Doorenspleet
#' 2000); Freedom House's list of electoral democracies (\code{fh_electoral});
#' the Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2013) extension of the PACL (Przeworski,
#' Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi) democracy/dictatorship dataset (\code{pacl});
#' Jay Ulfelder's indicator of democracy (\code{ulfelder_democracy} and
#' `ulfelder_democracy_extended`), based on a recoding of the Polity IV data
#' (Ulfelder 2012); a calculated measure of democracy from the PIPE
#' (Prezeworski et al 2010) dataset (`PIPE_democracy` - use with care as it
#' may be incorrectly calculated) and a number of dichotomous
#' democracy/non-democracy indicators (\code{gwf_democracy},
#' `gwf_democracy_extended`, `kailitz_binary`, `magaloni_democracy`,
#' `magaloni_democracy_extended`, \code{svolik_democracy}, `utip_dichotomous`,
#' \code{utip_dichotomous_strict}, `reign`, \code{wth_democ1}, and
#' `wth_democrobust`) from datasets concerned with the identification of
#' authoritarian regime types (Bell 2016; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014;
#' Svolik 2012, Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius 2013, Kailitz 2013). These are
#' all highly but not perfectly correlated with one another, with correlation
#' coefficients ranging from 0.69 (\code{magaloni_democracy_extended} and
#' \code{doorenspleet}) to 0.95 (\code{reign_democracy} and
#' \code{gwf_democracy_extended_strict})
#'
#' Of these, only Doorenspleet's and Bernhard, Nordstrom, and Reenock's
#' measures give special weight to the extent of suffrage in determining
#' whether a country is democratic; not surprisingly, they display the lowest
#' correlation with the other dichotomous indicators of democracy. All of
#' these indexes have world-wide spatial scope, though they differ greatly in
#' temporal coverage. \code{doorenspleet}, \code{bmr_democracy}, `reign`, and
#' the "extended" versions of `magaloni_democracy`, `gwf_democracy`, and
#' `ulfelder_democracy` have the widest temporal scope, going all the way back
#' to the 19th century and in some cases beyond.
#'
#' @section Trichotomous indexes of democracy:
#'
#' Trichotomous indexes of democracy distinguish explicitly a "hybrid" or
#' "semi-democratic" category. These include the measure of democracy in
#' Central America developed by Bowman, Lehoucq, and Mahoney (\code{blm}, see
#' Bowman, Lehoucq, and Mahoney 2005), the trichotomous measure of democracy
#' in Latin America by Mainwaring, Brinks, and Perez Linan
#' (\code{mainwaring}), the "Political Regime Change" dataset (\code{prc},
#' omitting the code for "transition" in the original dataset) described in
#' Gasiorowski 1996 and extended in Reich 2002; and a couple of measures taken
#' from datasets of autocratic regimes that explicitly distinguish between
#' full democracies, electoral or multiparty autocracies, and other
#' autocracies (\code{utip_trichotomous}, \code{kailitz_tri}). Both \code{blm}
#' and \code{mainwaring} are regional indexes developed by scholars with
#' Latin-American expertise; the rest have world-wide scope. These correlate
#' with each other at levels ranging from 0.70 (`kailitz_tri` and `blm`) to
#' 0.9 (`blm` and `mainwaring`).
#'
#' @section Ordinal indexes of democracy:
#'
#' These indexes distinguish more than three "degrees" of democracy, but they
#' are not explicitly continuous. They include Freedom House's 14 category
#' freedom index (\code{fh_total_reversed}); the 7 category Lexical Index of
#' Democracy (\code{lexical_index}, from Skaaning, Gerring, Bartusevicius
#' 2015); a 5 category indicator of democracy used by the Political
#' Instability Task Force based on the \code{parcomp} and \code{exrec}
#' variables of the Polity dataset (\code{pitf}, described in Goldstone et al
#' 2010); the Polity IV \code{polity2} variable; a calculated variable from
#' Przeworski 2010 (`PIPE_regime` - use with care, as it may be incorrectly
#' calculated) Coppedge and Reinicke's Polyarchy index
#' (\code{polyarchy_original_contestation} and
#' \code{polyarchy_original_polyarchy}, from Coppedge and Reinicke 1991). Of
#' these, the Polyarchy measures are specialist measures that only cover 357
#' country-years, but the rest have worldwide scope, \code{polity} and
#' \code{lexical_index} go all the way back to the beginning of the 19th
#' century.
#'
#' Most of these indexes are meant to capture "thicker" conceptions of
#' democracy. The Freedom House measure puts some emphasis on civil and
#' political rights; Polity and PITF focus on differences in "authority
#' patterns" (though they tend to downplay the scope of participation);
#' Polyarchy tries to operationalize both the participation and contestation
#' dimensions of Dahl's "Polyarchy" concept; and LIED tries to incorporate the
#' degree of suffrage using measures originally collected for the PIPE dataset
#' (Prezeworski et al 2010). They correlate with one another at levels ranging
#' from 0.81 (\code{lexical_index} and \code{pitf}) to 0.94 (\code{polity2}
#' and \code{pitf}).
#'
#' @section Continuous indexes of democracy:
#'
#' These indexes conceptualize democracy as a continuous quantity, and usually
#' in "thicker" ways. They include Arat's measure of democracy
#' (\code{pmm_arat}, from Arat 1991); Bollen's index of democracy
#' (\code{pmm_bollen}, from Bollen 2001); the World Governance Indicator's
#' Index of voice and Acocuntability (\code{wgi_democracy}); Axel Hadenius'
#' index of democracy, from Hadenius 1992 (\code{pmm_hadenius}); Munck's
#' measure of democracy (\code{pmm_munck}); several variants of the
#' Participation-Enhanced Polity Scores (e.g., \code{PEPS1v}, from Moon et al
#' 2006); the calculated inclusion and contestation dimensions from Coppedge,
#' Alvarez, and Maldonado (2008) (`polyarchy_inclusion_dimension` and
#' `polyarchy_contestation_dimension`); several indexes from V-dem (e.g.
#' \code{v2x_polyarchy}); the posterior means and medians for the three
#' releases of the Unified Democracy scores (`uds_*`, Pemstein, Meserve, and
#' Melton 2010) and Vanahnen's index of democratization
#' (\code{vanhanen_democratization}). Of these, the Unified democracy indexes,
#' the V-Dem indexes, and the Polyarchy dimensions are themselves latent
#' variable indexes.
#'
#' Vanhanen and PEPS give special weight to participation in the measurement
#' of democracy; the WGI index combines a very wide variety of indicators of
#' democracy. Only Vanahanen, the V-dem measure, and PEPS have long temporal
#' coverage; the WGI Voice and Accountability index has broad spatial coverage
#' but is only available for a short time series. Arat and Bollen go back only
#' until the 1950s, though they do have reasonable spatial coverage.
#'
#' Correlations vary from a low of 0.26 (Munck and the WGI, 126 country-year
#' overlap, nonsignificant) to over 0.97 for various for V-Dem indexes. The
#' lowest correlations are typically with the WGI measure of democracy.
#'
#' @section Spatial and temporal organization:
#'
#' The state system is complicated, and not always amenable to presentation in
#' tabular form. Countries change name, split, get absorbed into larger units,
#' and are not always obviously independent. This dataset basically follows
#' the Gleditsch and Ward list of independent states (Gleditsch and Ward 1999,
#' updated by Gleditsch to 2013), supplemented by Gleditsch's tentative list
#' of microstates (available at
#' \url{http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/statelist.html}). The Gleditsch and
#' Ward list is very similar, but not identical, to the Correlates of War list
#' of independent states that is commonly used in Political Science and
#' International Relations research; in particular, the treatment of Germany,
#' Yemen, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Yugoslavia, Serbia, Montenegro, and a few other
#' countries and their successor states differs between them.
#'
#' I have included two different codes for each country-year: the Gleditsch
#' and Ward country code (\code{GWn}), and the COW code (\code{cown}), as well
#' as an indicator of whether the country year is considered to be "in the
#' international system" by Gleditsch and Ward (\code{in_GW_system}). Since
#' the Gleditsch and Ward "international system" begins with the Congress of
#' Vienna in 1816, country-years before 1816 are by definition not "in
#' system," even though this does not mean that these states were not
#' independent then. Care should thus be taken with the "in system" indicator
#' for years before 1816.
#'
#' It is worth noting that while most measures of democracy are produced only
#' for sovereign countries, a number of measures have also been produced,
#' either explicitly (the V-dem project, Freedom House) or not (sometimes
#' researchers do not agree on whether a country-year represents a "sovereign"
#' state), for non-sovereign territories. In fact in this dataset about 6415
#' country-years in or after 1816 are not "in system" (most of them from the
#' V-dem indexes of democracy); these are easily excluded by filtering the
#' dataset using the boolean \code{in_GW_system} indicator (or a logical
#' expression that filters data points that are not in system after 1816 but
#' includes those before 1816).
#'
#' All countries are measured as of 31 December of the given year, as is the
#' conventional rule. Some datasets do not use this rule (e.g., Freedom House,
#' Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014), and others sometimes contain more than
#' one data point per year (e.g., the Political Regime Change dataset); I have
#' tried my best to transform their coding so that all datapoints conform to
#' convention, but some errors may remain.
#'
#' @section A note on sources:
#'
#' Wherever possible, I have used the original sources for these measures of
#' democracy and put them in the right panel format myself. For details, see
#' the [democracyData](https://github.com/xmarquez/democracyData) package.
#' There are three exceptions.
#'
#' First, in a few cases I have relied on the replication data for Pemstein,
#' Meserve, and Melton (2010), which contains data I have not been able to
#' find elsewhere. These variables are marked \code{pmm_*}, and they are not
#' always perfectly correlated with the original data (where available). For
#' example, \code{fh_pmm} includes data for 1981, whereas
#' \code{fh_total_reversed} conventionally does not; and there are a number of
#' divergences between PMM's \code{pmm_prc} data and the \code{prc} dataset
#' available from Reich 2002 that seem to have something to do with the
#' treatment of country-years that include transition periods. A more extended
#' discussion of the differences between the PMM replication data and the
#' original data sources is available in a package vignette; see
#' \code{vignette("Differences_between_PMM_and_original_data")} for details.)
#'
#' Second, I have constructed the \code{PIPE_democracy}, `PIPE_regime`, and
#' \code{pitf*} variables following the instructions in the source, but have
#' not found the data ready-made. This is probably unproblematic in the case
#' of \code{pitf} -- the instructions are very clear -- but less so in the
#' case of \code{przeworski}, where the instructions are less clear and it is
#' difficult to produce a test that indicates whether the variable is properly
#' constructed. It is also worth noting that the Polity data is occasionally
#' revised, so that the \code{pitf} variable described and used in Goldstone
#' et al 2010 is probably different from the \code{pitf} variable here for a
#' small number of country-years. (Similarly, \code{pmm_polity} and
#' \code{polity2} differ in a few instances due to revisions of the Polity
#' data between 2010 and today.)
#'
#' Third, on at least one occasion I have recalculated an index from its
#' original sources in different ways (see the \code{utip_dichotomous},
#' \code{utip_dichotomous_strict}, and \code{utip_trichotomous} variables),
#' since the original data does not provide an unambiguous measure.
#'
#' @template standard-variables
#'
#' @section Democracy measures:
#'
#' \describe{
#'
#' \item{anckar_democracy}{The Anckar-Fredriksson 2018 measure of democracy,
#' as a numeric value. Up to 2010 this should be identical to
#' `bmr_democracy_omitteddata`. 0 = non-democracy, 1 = democracy.}
#'
#' \item{arat_pmm}{Democracy score from Arat 1991. Taken from Pemstein,
#' Meserve, and Melton 2013. Min = 29, max = 109, n = 3873.}
#'
#'
#' \item{blm}{Trichotomous measure of regime type from Bowman, Lehoucq, and
#' Mahoney 2005. 0 = authoritarian, 0.5 = semidemocratic, 1 = democratic.
#' Available only for five Latin American countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador,
#' Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) from 1900 to 2000.}
#'
#' \item{pmm_blm}{Same as previous but taken from Pemstein, Meserve, and
#' Melton 2013. 0 = authoritarian, 0.5 = semidemocratic, 1 = democratic.
#' Available only for five Latin American countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador,
#' Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) from 1946 to 2000 in this version.
#' Included here in order to replicate the original model from Pemstein,
#' Meserve, and Melton 2011.}
#'
#' \item{bmr_democracy}{Dichotomous measure of regime type from Boix, Miller,
#' and 2012, version 3.0. 1 = democracy, 0 = non-democracy. N = 16987.}
#'
#' \item{bmr_democracy_omitteddata}{Dichotomous measure of regime type from
#' Boix, Miller, and 2012, version 3.0. 1 = democracy, 0 = non-democracy. This
#' is the same measure as `bmr_democracy`, except it records an `NA` for
#' countries occupied during an international war (e.g., the Netherlands
#' 1940-44) or experiencing state collapse during a civil war (e.g., Lebanon
#' 1976-89). The democracy variable instead fills in these years as
#' continuations of the same regime type. N = 16762.}
#'
#' \item{bmr_democracy_femalesuffrage}{According to the BMR version 3.0
#' codebook, this is the same measure as `bmr_democracy`, except that it also
#' requires that at least half of adult women have the right to vote. 30
#' countries change values.}
#'
#' \item{bnr}{Dichotomous indicator of democracy from the Bernhard, Nordstrom
#' & Reenock 2001.}
#'
#' \item{bnr_extended}{Dichotomous indicator of democracy from the Bernhard,
#' Nordstrom & Reenock 2001. This version indicator has been put in
#' country-year format, extending to 1913, with the help of the Correlates of
#' War panel of independent states; independent countries (not microstates) in
#' this panel that were not included in the original dataset are assumed to be
#' non-democratic for the period. See
#' [democracyData](https://github.com/xmarquez/democracyData) for more
#' information about the additional country-years generated in this way.}
#'
#' \item{pmm_bollen}{0-100 index of democracy from Bollen 2001. Taken from
#' Pemstein, Meserve, and Melton 2013.}
#'
#' \item{doorenspleet}{Dichotomous index of democracy from Doorenspleet 2000.
#' 1 = authoritarian, 2 = democracy. Omits periods of interruption.}
#'
#' \item{eiu}{The Economist Intelligence Unit's democracy index.}
#'
#' \item{wgi_democracy}{Voice and Accountability index from the World
#' Governance Indicators. Taken from \url{http://www.govindicators.org}.}
#'
#' \item{fh_total_reversed}{Average civil liberties + political rights score
#' (reversed so higher values are more democratic) from Freedom House. 2018.
#' "Freedom in the World." Original data available at
#' \url{http://www.freedomhouse.org}. Goes from 0 (least democratic) to 13
#' (most democratic). In this version, the index does not include a value for
#' 1981. This is based on the latest Freedom House data going all the way to
#' 2017.}
#'
#' \item{pmm_fh}{Same as previous but taken from Pemstein, Meserve, and Melton
#' 2013. Goes from 1 (least democratic) to 7 (most democratic). In this
#' version the index stops at 2008. It also includes a value for 1981. For
#' more on the differences between this variable and the current FH Freedom in
#' the World index, see
#' [democracyData](https://github.com/xmarquez/democracyData).}
#'
#' \item{fh_electoral}{An indicator of whether a country is an "electoral
#' democracy" in Freedom House's estimation (1 = yes, 0 - no). Original data
#' available at \url{http://www.freedomhouse.org}. Available only from 1989.
#' This is based on the latest Freedom House electoral democracies list going
#' all the way to 2016.}
#'
#' \item{gwf_democracy}{Dichotmous democracy/autocracy indicator from Geddes,
#' Wright, and Frantz 2014. 0 = autocracy, 1 = democracy.}
#'
#' \item{gwf_democracy_extended}{Dichotmous democracy/autocracy indicator from
#' Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014. 0 = autocracy, 1 = democracy. Extended
#' beyond 1945 using Geddes, Wright, and Frantz's case variable, which encodes
#' information about the first year of the regime. For more detail on the
#' resulting additional country-years, see
#' [democracyData](https://github.com/xmarquez/democracyData).}
#'
#' \item{pmm_hadenius}{0-10 index of democracy from Hadenius 1992. Taken from
#' Pemstein, Meserve, and Melton 2013. Higher values are more democratic.}
#'
#' \item{kailitz_binary}{Dichotomous democracy indicator from Kailitz 2013. 0
#' = autocracy (all types including electoral autocracy), 1 = liberal
#' democracy.}
#'
#' \item{kailitz_tri}{Trichotomous democracy indicator from Kailitz 2013. 0 =
#' autocracy (all types except electoral autocracy), 1 = electoral autocracy,
#' 2 = liberal democracy.}
#'
#' \item{lexical_index}{0-6 Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy from
#' Skaaning, Gerring, and Bartusevicius 2015. This is from V3 of the dataset,
#' updated to 2015.
#'
#' 0 = nonelectoral,
#'
#' 1 = one- or no- party elections,
#'
#' 2 = limited competition multiparty elections for legislature only,
#'
#' 3 = Limited competition multiparty elections for both executive and
#' legislature,
#'
#' 4 = Competitive elections for executive and legislative, limited suffrage,
#'
#' 5 = Male democracy,
#'
#' 6 = Electoral democracy.}
#'
#' \item{magaloni_democracy}{Dichotomous democracy indicator from Magaloni,
#' Chu, and Min 2013. 0 = autocracy (all types including multiparty
#' autocracy), 1 = democracy.}
#'
#' \item{magaloni_democracy_extended}{Dichotomous democracy indicator from
#' Magaloni, Chu, and Min 2013. 0 = autocracy (all types including multiparty
#' autocracy), 1 = democracy. Extended beyond 1950 using the
#' \code{duration_nr} variable of the original dataset, which encodes
#' information about the first year of each regime. For more detail on the
#' resulting additional country-years, see
#' [democracyData](https://github.com/xmarquez/democracyData).}
#'
#' \item{mainwaring}{Trichotomous democracy indicator from Mainwaring, Brinks,
#' and Perez Linan 2008. 0 = non-democracy, 0.5 = hybrid, 1 = democracy.}
#'
#' \item{pmm_mainwaring}{Same as previous but taken from Pemstein, Meserve,
#' and Melton 2013. In this version the indicator goes only to 1945, and it is
#' missing some country-years. -1 = non-democracy, 0 = hybrid, 1 = democracy.
#' For more on the differences between this variable and the original
#' Mainwaring et al data, see
#' \code{vignette("Differences_between_PMM_and_original_data")}. Included in
#' order to replicate the original PMM 2010 model.}
#'
#'
#' \item{pmm_munck}{0-1 index of democracy from Munck 2009. Taken from
#' Pemstein, Meserve, and Melton 2013. Only available for 342 country-years.
#' Higher values are more democratic.}
#'
#' \item{pacl}{Dichotomous measure of democracy from Cheibub, Gandhi, and
#' Vreeland 2010. 1= democracy, 0 = non-democracy.}
#'
#' \item{pmm_pacl}{Same as previous but taken from Pemstein, Meserve, and
#' Melton 2013. This is missing a couple of countries in the original dataset;
#' for more detail on the missing cases, see
#' \code{vignette("Differences_between_PMM_and_original_data")}.}
#'
#' \item{PEPS1i}{Participation-Enhanced Polity Score 1, polity score adjusted
#' using IDEA Votes/Voting age population. From Moon et al. (2006).}
#'
#' \item{PEPS2i}{Participation-Enhanced Polity Score 2, polity score adjusted
#' using IDEA Votes/Voting age population. From Moon et al. (2006).}
#'
#' \item{PEPS1v}{Participation-Enhanced Polity Score 1, polity score adjusted
#' using Vanhanen votes/two-thirds of Vanhanen population. From Moon et al.
#' (2006).}
#'
#' \item{PEPS2v}{Participation-Enhanced Polity Score 2, polity score adjusted
#' using Vanhanen votes/two-thirds of Vanhanen population. From Moon et al.
#' (2006).}
#'
#' \item{PEPS1q}{Participation-Enhanced Polity Score 1, polity score adjusted
#' using (mostly)IDEA votes/Voting age population, with participation coded
#' zero for noncompetitive elections. From Moon et al. (2006).}
#'
#' \item{PEPS2q}{Participation-Enhanced Polity Score 2, polity score adjusted
#' using (mostly)IDEA votes/Voting age population, with participation coded
#' zero for noncompetitive elections. From Moon et al. (2006).}
#'
#' \item{pitf}{A five category indicator of democracy described in Goldstone
#' et al 2010. Can be:
#'
#' 0-Full autocracy (`exrec` < 7, `parcomp` !=0 and `parcomp` < 3)
#'
#' 1-Partial autocracy (`exrec` < 7, `parcomp` = 0 or `parcomp` > 2)
#'
#' 2-Partial democracy with factionalism (`exrec` > 6, `parcomp` = 3)
#'
#' 3-Partial democracy (`exrec` > 6, `parcomp` = 0 or `parcomp` = 4 or
#' `parcomp` = 5 but `exrec` != 8)
#'
#' 4-Full democracy (`exrec` = 8, `parcomp` = 5). See Goldstone et al. 2010
#' for full details.}
#'
#' \item{pitf_binary}{A simplification of the \code{pitf} indicator of
#' democracy described in Taylor and Ulfelder 2015. A country is a democracy
#' (1) "if its chief executive is chosen in competitive elections (`exrec`
#' equal to 7 or 8) and political competition is not suppressed (`parcomp`
#' equal to 0 or `parcomp` greater than 2)" Otherwise it is a non-democracy
#' (0).}
#'
#' \item{polity}{Annual polity index, excluding special codes for
#' interruption, interregnum, and transition (-88,-77,-66). Higher values are
#' more democratic. From Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2015.}
#'
#' \item{polity2}{Annual polity2 index, interpolating values for interruption,
#' interregnum, and transition periods. Higher values are more democratic.
#' From Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2015.}
#'
#' \item{polity_pmm}{Same as previous, but taken from Pemstein, Meserve, and
#' Melton 2013. In this version the indicator only goes to 1945, and it
#' differs from \code{polity2} in a few cases. For more detail on the
#' differences, see
#' \code{vignette("Differences_between_PMM_and_original_data")}. Included only
#' in order to be able to replicate the PMM 2011 model.}
#'
#' \item{polyarchy_original_polyarchy}{0-10 index of democracy from Coppedge
#' and Reinicke 1991. Revised in 2003-2006. This has been reversed so that
#' higher values are more democratic; the original index was scored so that 0
#' was less democratic. The codebook for the dataset suggests using
#' \code{polyarchy_original_contestation} instead, a more reliable version of
#' the polyarchy scale with fewer categories. Includes a value for Western
#' Sahara in 2000, which has been assigned COW code 605; Western Sahara is not
#' coded by any other dataset in this compilation, and is not considered an
#' independent state by either Gleditsch and Ward or the Correlates of War
#' project. Exclude if necessary.}
#'
#' \item{pmm_polyarchy}{Same as \code{polyarchy_reversed} but taken from
#' Pemstein, Meserve, and Melton 2013. Note that there are 22 discrepancies
#' between \code{polyarchy_reversed} and \code{polyarchy_pmm}; these appear to
#' be due to transcription error in PMM's replication dataset.
#' \code{pmm_polyarchy} also misses 4 country-years in
#' \code{polyarchy_original_polyarchy}. For more detail on the differences,
#' see \code{vignette("Differences_between_PMM_and_original_data")}. Included
#' only in order to be able to replicate the PMM 2011 model.}
#'
#' \item{polyarchy_original_contestation}{1-9 index of contestation from the
#' revised version of Coppedge and Reinicke. 1991. Revised in 2003-2006.
#' Includes a value for Western Sahara in 2000, which has been assigned code
#' 605; Western Sahara is not coded by any other dataset in this compilation,
#' and is not considered an independent state by either Gleditsch and Ward or
#' the Correlates of War project. Meaning of the scale is as follows:
#'
#' 9 Meaningful fair elections are held, there is full freedom for political
#' organization and expression, and there is no preferential presentation of
#' official views in the media.
#'
#' 8 Meaningful fair elections are held and there is full freedom for
#' political organization and expression, but there is preferential
#' presentation of official views in the media.
#'
#' 7 Meaningful fair elections are held and there is full freedom for
#' political organization, but some public dissent is suppressed and there is
#' preferential presentation of official views in the media.
#'
#' 6 Meaningful fair elections are held, but some independent political
#' organizations are banned, some public dissent is suppressed, and there is
#' preferential presentation of official views in the media.
#'
#' 5 Elections are marred by fraud or coercion, some independent political
#' organizations are banned, some public dissent is suppressed, and there is
#' preferential presentation of official views in the media.
#'
#' 4 Like score 5 except that there is less contestation in one or two of the
#' following respects: no meaningful elections are held, only nonpolitical
#' organizations are allowed to be independent, or alternatives to the
#' official media are very limited.
#'
#' 3 No meaningful elections are held, only nonpolitical organizations are
#' allowed to be independent, some public dissent is suppressed, and
#' alternatives to the official media are very limited.
#'
#' 2 Like score 3 except that there is less contestation in one or two of the
#' following respects: all organizations are banned or controlled by the
#' government or official party, all public dissent is suppressed, or there is
#' no public alternative to official information.
#'
#' 1 No meaningful elections are held, all organizations are banned or
#' controlled by the government or official party, all public dissent is
#' suppressed, and there is no public alternative to official information.}
#'
#' \item{polyarchy_contestation_dimension}{The contestation dimension
#' (`CONTEST`) in the dataset described in Coppedge, Alvarez, and Maldonado
#' 2008.}
#'
#' \item{polyarchy_inclusion_dimension}{The inclusion dimension (`INCLUS`) in
#' the dataset described in Coppedge, Alvarez, and Maldonado 2008.}
#'
#' \item{prc}{Trichotomous index of democracy from Gasiorowski 1996. Available
#' in updated form in Reich 2002. 1= Authoritarian, 3 = semidemocratic, 4 =
#' democratic. Transitional categories coded `NA`.}
#'
#' \item{pmm_prc}{Same as previous but taken from Pemstein, Meserve, and
#' Melton 2013. In this version the indicator only goes to 1945. It also
#' differs from the original data in a few cases (including the fact that it
#' includes the transition category, coded `NA` in `prc`). For more detail on
#' the differences, see For more detail on the differences, see
#' \code{vignette("Differences_between_PMM_and_original_data")}. Included only
#' in order to be able to replicate the PMM 2011 model.}
#'
#' \item{PIPE_regime}{Calculated regime type variable from the PIPE dataset.
#' Przeworski et al. 2013. This variable is not found in the downloadable
#' dataset; it is calculated according to the instructions in the codebook.
#' The documentation gives the following instructions:
#'
#' "0 if \code{electoral_age} (a variable in the original dataset) is missing.
#' There are two distinct reasons why it may be missing: either elections are
#' not held regularly or they are held but the winner does not complete a term
#' in office or makes an autocoup. Elections are considered not to be held if
#' (1) there is a constitution that specifies the length of term of the chief
#' executive (or the legislature) and this period is exceeded by more than one
#' year, except for war years, (2) there is no constitution or the
#' constitution does not provide for elections and no elections are held
#' during this period.
#'
#' 1 if \code{electoral_age} is not missing and \code{opposition = 0} (a
#' variable in the original dataset) (or \code{republic_age} is missing).
#' These are regimes in which elections are held regularly and the winners (or
#' their constitutional successors) complete electoral terms but either
#' elections are uncontested or there is one party and independents or parties
#' are banned and everyone runs as independent. Note that if everyone runs as
#' independents it is possible for the incumbent government to lose an
#' election, as in Swaziland in 1993. It is also possible for the incumbent to
#' lose if the regime had no opposition up to some time when a competitive
#' election occurred but the winner did not complete a term, as in Honduras in
#' 1852. Finally, incumbents can lose when \code{regime = 1} if the election
#' was competitive but at the end of the year the opposition was suppressed,
#' as in Panama in 1968.
#'
#' 2 if \code{republic_age} (a variable in the original dataset) is not
#' missing, that is if \code{electoral_age} is not missing and
#' \code{opposition = 1} (there is some minimal opposition), but no strong
#' alternation has ocurred (power has not changed hands).
#'
#' 3 if \code{democracy_age} (\code{democracy_age} is not found in the
#' original dataset) is not missing, that is, the country has elections, there
#' is opposition, and a strong alternation -- a change in parties controlling
#' the government -- has occurred."}
#'
#' \item{reign_democracy}{A measure of democracy from Bell 2016, obtained by
#' coding all presidential and parliamentary democracies as 1, all other
#' regimes as 0.}
#'
#' \item{csvmdi}{The continuous Support Vector Machine democracy index from
#' Grundler and Krieger 2018.}
#'
#' \item{svmdi_2016}{The continuous Support Vector Machine democracy index
#' from Grundler and Krieger 2016.}
#'
#' \item{dsvmdi}{The dichotomous Support Vector Machine democracy index from
#' Grundler and Krieger 2018.}
#'
#' \item{svolik_democracy}{Dichotomous indicator of democracy from Svolik
#' 2012. 0 = authoritarian, 1 = democracy.}
#'
#' \item{ulfelder_democracy}{Dichotomous indicator of democracy from Ulfelder
#' 2012. 0 = authoritarian, 1 = democracy.}
#'
#' \item{ulfelder_democracy_extended}{Dichotomous indicator of democracy from
#' Ulfelder 2012. 0 = authoritarian, 1 = democracy, extended back in time
#' using the regime duration information in the dataset. For more details on
#' the additional country-years coded this way, see
#' [democracyData](https://github.com/xmarquez/democracyData)}
#'
#' \item{utip_dichotomous}{Calculated dichotomous index of democracy from data
#' in the UTIP dataset of political regimes (Hsu 2008). 1 if the regime is a
#' social democracy, conservative democracy, or one party democracy, 0
#' otherwise. The category of "one party democracy" is not well documented.}
#'
#' \item{utip_dichotomous_strict}{Stricter version of the calculated
#' dichotomous index of democracy from data in the UTIP dataset of political
#' regimes (Hsu 2008). 1 if the regime is a social democracy or a conservative
#' democracy, 0 otherwise. This excludes "one party democracies" from the
#' democracy category.}
#'
#' \item{utip_trichotomous}{Calculated trichotomous index of democracy from
#' data in the UTIP dataset of political regimes (Hsu 2008). 2 if the regime
#' is a social democracy or conservative democracy, 1 if the regime is a one
#' party democracy, 0 otherwise. The category of "one party democracy" is not
#' well documented.}
#'
#' \item{v2x_api}{Additive polyarchy index from V-dem version 7.1, Coppedge et
#' al 2017.Higher values are more democratic.}
#'
#' \item{v2x_delibdem}{Deliberative democracy index from V-dem version 7.1,
#' Coppedge et al 2017.Higher values are more democratic.}
#'
#' \item{v2x_egaldem}{Egalitarian democracy index from V-dem version 7.1,
#' Coppedge et al 2017.Higher values are more democratic.}
#'
#' \item{v2x_libdem}{Egalitarian democracy index from V-dem version 7.1,
#' Coppedge et al 2017.Higher values are more democratic.}
#'
#' \item{v2x_mpi}{Multiplicative polyarchy index from V-dem version 7.1,
#' Coppedge et al 2017.Higher values are more democratic.}
#'
#' \item{v2x_partipdem}{Participatory democracy index from V-dem version 7.1,
#' Coppedge et al 2017.Higher values are more democratic.}
#'
#' \item{v2x_polyarchy}{Continuous polyarchy index from V-dem version 7.1,
#' Coppedge et al 2017.Higher values are more democratic.}
#'
#' \item{vanhanen_competition}{Index of competition from Vanhanen 2012. From
#' Vanahnen's documentation: "The smaller parties' share of the votes cast in
#' parliamentary or presidential elections, or both, is used to indicate the
#' degree of competition. It is calculated by subtracting the percentage of
#' votes won by the largest party from 100. If the largest party gets, for
#' example, 40 percent of the votes, the share of the smaller parties is 60
#' percent. If data on the distribution of votes are not available, the value
#' of this variable is calculated on the basis of the distribution of seats in
#' parliament. The distribution of seats is used also in cases in which it
#' seems to indicate power relations more realistically than the distribution
#' of votes." Its maximum value is 70. See the full documentation for
#' Vanhanen's dataset for details.}
#'
#' \item{vanhanen_participation}{Index of participation from Vanhanen 2012.
#' From Vanahnen's documentation: "The percentage of the population which
#' actually voted in the same elections is used to measure the degree of
#' participation (= Participation). This percentage is calculated from the
#' total population, not from the adult or enfranchized population." It is
#' zero by construction in cases where no popular elections exist. May be
#' modified by referenda. See the full documentation of Vanhanen's dataset for
#' details.}
#'
#' \item{vanhanen_democratization}{Index of democratization from Vanhanen
#' 2012. Higher values are more democratic. Constructed multiplicatively from
#' \code{vanhanen_participation} and \code{vanhanen_competition}.}
#'
#' \item{pmm_vanhanen}{Same as \code{vanhanen_democratization} but taken from
#' Pemstein, Meserve, and Melton. 2013. There are some small differences
#' between this variable and `vanhanen_democratization`. For more detail on
#' the differences, see
#' \code{vignette("Differences_between_PMM_and_original_data")}. Included only
#' in order to be able to replicate the PMM 2011 model exactly.}
#'
#' \item{wth_democ1}{Dichotomous measure of democracy from Wahman, Teorell,
#' and Hadenius 2013, obtaining by coding 1 all democracies according to the
#' `regime1ny` variable, 0 all other regimes.}
#'
#' \item{wth_democrobust}{Dichotomous measure of democracy from Wahman,
#' Teorell, and Hadenius 2013, obtaining by coding 1 all democracies according
#' to the `regimenyrobust` variable, 0 all other regimes.}
#'
#' }
#'
#' @references
#'
#' Anckar, Carsten and C. Fredriksson. 2018. "Classifying political regimes
#' 1800-2016: a typology and a new dataset". European Political Science. DOI:
#' 10.1057/s41304-018-0149-8. Data and codebook available at
#' \url{https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-018-0149-8}.
#'
#' Arat, Zehra F. 1991. Democracy and human rights in developing countries.
#' Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
#'
#' Bernhard, Michael Timothy Nordstrom, and Christopher Reenock, "Economic
#' Performance, Institutional Intermediation and Democratic Breakdown," Journal
#' of Politics 63:3 (2001), pp. 775-803. Data and coding description available
#' at \url{http://users.clas.ufl.edu/bernhard/content/data/data.htm}
#'
#' Bell 2016. The Rulers, Elections, and Irregular Governance Dataset (REIGN).
#' OEF research. Data available at \url{http://oefresearch.org/datasets/reign}
#'
#' Boix, Carles, Michael Miller, and Sebastian Rosato. 2012. A Complete Data Set
#' of Political Regimes, 1800-2007. Comparative Political Studies 46 (12):
#' 1523-1554. Original data available at
#' \url{https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/FJLMKT}
#'
#' Bollen, Kenneth A. 2001. "Cross-National Indicators of Liberal Democracy,
#' 1950-1990." 2nd ICPSR version. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina,
#' 1998. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
#' Research, 2001. Original data available at
#' \url{http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-STUDY/02532.xml}.
#'
#' Bowman, Kirk, Fabrice Lehoucq, and James Mahoney. 2005. Measuring Political
#' Democracy: Case Expertise, Data Adequacy, and Central America. Comparative
#' Political Studies 38 (8): 939-970.
#' \url{http://cps.sagepub.com/content/38/8/939}. Data available at
#' \url{http://www.blmdemocracy.gatech.edu/}.
#'
#' Cheibub, Jose Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2010.
#' "Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited." Public Choice. 143(1):67-101.
#' Original data available at
#' \url{https://sites.google.com/site/joseantoniocheibub/datasets/democracy-and-dictatorship-revisited}.
#'
#' Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning,
#' and Jan Teorell, with David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Adam
#' Glynn, Allen Hicken, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Kelly McMann, Pamela Paxton, Daniel
#' Pemstein, Jeffrey Staton, Brigitte Zimmerman, Frida Andersson, Valeriya
#' Mechkova, Farhad Miri. 2017. V-Dem Codebook v7.1. Varieties of Democracy
#' (V-Dem) Project. Original data available at \url{https://v-dem.net/en/data/}.
#'
#' Coppedge, Michael, Angel Alvarez and Claudia Maldonado. 2008 "Two Persistent
#' Dimensions of Democracy: Contestation and Inclusiveness".The Journal of
#' Politics 70(03), pp. 632-647. DOI: 10.1017/S0022381608080663. Original data
#' available at \url{https://www3.nd.edu/~mcoppedg/crd/datacrd.htm}.
#'
#' Coppedge, Michael and Wolfgang H. Reinicke. 1991. Measuring Polyarchy. In On
#' Measuring Democracy: Its Consequences and Concomitants, ed. Alex Inkeles. New
#' Brunswuck, NJ: Transaction pp. 47-68. Original data available at
#' \url{https://www3.nd.edu/~mcoppedg/crd/datacrd.htm}.
#'
#' Doorenspleet, Renske. 2000. Reassessing the Three Waves of Democratization.
#' World Politics 52 (03): 384-406. DOI: 10.1017/S0043887100016580.
#' \url{http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0043887100016580}.
#'
#' Freedom House. 2018. "Freedom in the World." Original data available at
#' \url{http://www.freedomhouse.org}.
#'
#' Gasiorowski, Mark J. 1996. "An Overview of the Political Regime Change
#' Dataset." Comparative Political Studies 29(4):469-483.
#'
#' Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. 2014. Autocratic Breakdown
#' and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set. Perspectives on Politics 12 (1):
#' 313-331. Original data available at \url{http://dictators.la.psu.edu/}.
#'
#' Gleditsch, Kristian S. & Michael D. Ward. 1999. "Interstate System
#' Membership: A Revised List of the Independent States since 1816."
#' International Interactions 25: 393-413. The list can be found at
#' \url{http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/statelist.html}
#'
#' Goldstone, Jack, Robert Bates, David Epstein, Ted Gurr, Michael Lustik, Monty
#' Marshall, Jay Ulfelder, and Mark Woodward. 2010. A Global Model for
#' Forecasting Political Instability. American Journal of Political Science 54
#' (1): 190-208. DOI:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00426.x
#'
#' Grundler, K. and T. Krieger. 2018. "Machine Learning Indices, Political
#' Institutions, and Economic Development". Report. CESifo Group Munich, 2018.
#' \url{https://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp6930.pdf}.
#'
#' Grundler, K. and T. Krieger. 2016. "Democracy and growth: Evidence from a
#' machine learning indicator". European Journal of Political Economy 45, pp.
#' 85-107. DOI: \url{https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.05.005}.
#'
#' Hadenius, Axel. 1992. Democracy and Development. Cambridge: Cambridge
#' University Press.
#'
#' Hadenius, Axel & Jan Teorell. 2007. "Pathways from Authoritarianism", Journal
#' of Democracy 18(1): 143-156.
#'
#' Hsu, Sara "The Effect of Political Regimes on Inequality, 1963-2002," UTIP
#' Working Paper No. 53 (2008),
#' \url{http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/papers/utip_53.pdf}. Data available for
#' download at \url{http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/data/}.
#'
#' Kailitz, Steffen. 2013. Classifying political regimes revisited: legitimation
#' and durability. Democratization 20 (1): 39-60. Original data available at
#' \url{http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2013.738861}.
#'
#' Mainwaring, Scott, Daniel Brinks, and Anibal Perez Linan. 2008. "Political
#' Regimes in Latin America, 1900-2007." Original data available from
#' \url{http://kellogg.nd.edu/scottmainwaring/Political_Regimes.pdf}.
#'
#' Magaloni, Beatriz, Jonathan Chu, and Eric Min. 2013. Autocracies of the
#' World, 1950-2012 (Version 1.0). Dataset, Stanford University. Original data
#' and codebook available at
#' \url{http://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/research/autocracies_of_the_world_dataset/}
#'
#' Marshall, Monty G., Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers. 2012. "Polity IV:
#' Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2012." Updated to
#' 2015. Original data available from
#' \url{http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm}.
#'
#' Moon, Bruce E., Jennifer Harvey Birdsall, Sylvia Ceisluk, Lauren M. Garlett,
#' Joshua J. Hermias, Elizabeth Mendenhall, Patrick D. Schmid, and Wai Hong Wong
#' (2006) "Voting Counts: Participation in the Measurement of Democracy" Studies
#' in Comparative International Development 42, 2 (Summer, 2006). The complete
#' dataset is available here:
#' \url{http://www.lehigh.edu/~bm05/democracy/Obtain_data.htm}.
#'
#' Munck, Gerardo L. 2009. Measuring Democracy: A Bridge Between Scholarship and
#' Politics. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
#'
#' Pemstein, Daniel, Stephen Meserve, and James Melton. 2010. Democratic
#' Compromise: A Latent Variable Analysis of Ten Measures of Regime Type.
#' Political Analysis 18 (4): 426-449.
#'
#' Pemstein, Daniel, Stephen A. Meserve, and James Melton. 2013. "Replication
#' data for: Democratic Compromise: A Latent Variable Analysis of Ten Measures
#' of Regime Type." In: Harvard Dataverse.
#' \url{http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/PMM}
#'
#' Przeworski, Adam et al. 2013. Political Institutions and Political Events
#' (PIPE) Data Set. Department of Politics, New York University.
#' \url{https://sites.google.com/a/nyu.edu/adam-przeworski/home/data}
#'
#' Reich, G. 2002. Categorizing Political Regimes: New Data for Old Problems.
#' Democratization 9 (4): 1-24.
#' \url{http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/714000289}.
#'
#' Skaaning, Svend-Erik, John Gerring, and Henrikas Bartusevicius. 2015. A
#' Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy. Comparative Political Studies 48 (12):
#' 1491-1525. Original data available from
#' \url{http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/skaaning}.
#'
#' Svolik, Milan. 2012. The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. Cambridge and New
#' York: Cambridge University Press. Original data available from
#' \url{http://campuspress.yale.edu/svolik/the-politics-of-authoritarian-rule/}.
#'
#' Taylor, Sean J. and Ulfelder, Jay, A Measurement Error Model of Dichotomous
#' Democracy Status (May 20, 2015). Available at SSRN:
#' \url{http://ssrn.com/abstract=2726962} or
#' \url{http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2726962}
#'
#' The Economist Intelligence Unit. 2018. Democracy Index 2017: Free Speech under Attack.
#'
#' Ulfelder, Jay. 2012. "Democracy/Autocracy Data Set." In: Harvard Dataverse.
#' \url{http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/18836}.
#'
#' Vanhanen, Tatu. 2012. "FSD1289 Measures of Democracy 1810-2012." Original
#' data available from
#' \url{http://www.fsd.uta.fi/english/data/catalogue/FSD1289/meF1289e.html}
#'
#' Wahman, Michael, Jan Teorell, and Axel Hadenius. 2013. Authoritarian regime
#' types revisited: updated data in comparative perspective. Contemporary
#' Politics 19 (1): 19-34.
#' @family democracy
#' @author Xavier Marquez, Political Science and International Relations
#' Programme, Victoria University of Wellington, marquez.x@gmail.com
"democracy"
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#' All Democracy Scores Dataset
#'
#' A dataset containing all (or nearly all) extant democracy indexes.
#'
#' @section Overview:
#'
#' This dataset contains most democracy indexes in use today in a single panel
#' (country-year) file. It attempts to be as comprehensive as possible,
#' incorporating rarely used democracy indexes not easily available in
#' country-year format.
#'
#' The measurement of democracy is complicated and controversial. This dataset
#' makes few judgments about what counts as a measure of democracy, as long as
#' it has been used in scholarly work. It thus includes dichotomous,
#' trichotomous, ordinal, and continuous indices; indices that focus primarily
#' on the "competition" and indices that focus on the "participation"
#' dimension of democracy; "thick" indices that attempt to measure a wide
#' variety of characteristics plausibly attributed to democracy; and
#' "minimalist" indexes that restrict themselves to the bare minimum of
#' competition. Four broad families of democracy measures can be
#' distinguished:
#'
#' @section Dichotomous indexes of democracy:
#'
#' These are indexes designed to distinguish between democracy and
#' non-democracy. Most of them follow a fairly minimalist conception of
#' democracy, focused on political competition while giving little weight to
#' the extent of the suffrage or thicker civil or economic rights. These
#' include the Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2012) indicator of democracy
#' (`bmr_democracy`, `bmr_democracy_omitteddata`, and
#' `bmr_democracy_femalesuffrage`); the Bernhard, Nordstrom and Reenock index
#' of democracy (\code{bnr} and `bnr_extended`), originally developed for
#' event history analysis (Bernhard, Nordstrom, and Reenock 2001); Renske
#' Doorenspleet's indicator of democracy (\code{doorenspleet}), based on the
#' Polity III data and a measure of the extent of suffrage (Doorenspleet
#' 2000); Freedom House's list of electoral democracies (\code{fh_electoral});
#' the Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2013) extension of the PACL (Przeworski,
#' Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi) democracy/dictatorship dataset (\code{pacl});
#' Jay Ulfelder's indicator of democracy (\code{ulfelder_democracy} and
#' `ulfelder_democracy_extended`), based on a recoding of the Polity IV data
#' (Ulfelder 2012); a calculated measure of democracy from the PIPE
#' (Prezeworski et al 2010) dataset (`PIPE_democracy` - use with care as it
#' may be incorrectly calculated) and a number of dichotomous
#' democracy/non-democracy indicators (\code{gwf_democracy},
#' `gwf_democracy_extended`, `kailitz_binary`, `magaloni_democracy`,
#' `magaloni_democracy_extended`, \code{svolik_democracy}, `utip_dichotomous`,
#' \code{utip_dichotomous_strict}, `reign`, \code{wth_democ1}, and
#' `wth_democrobust`) from datasets concerned with the identification of
#' authoritarian regime types (Bell 2016; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014;
#' Svolik 2012, Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius 2013, Kailitz 2013). These are
#' all highly but not perfectly correlated with one another, with correlation
#' coefficients ranging from 0.69 (\code{magaloni_democracy_extended} and
#' \code{doorenspleet}) to 0.95 (\code{reign_democracy} and
#' \code{gwf_democracy_extended_strict})
#'
#' Of these, only Doorenspleet's and Bernhard, Nordstrom, and Reenock's
#' measures give special weight to the extent of suffrage in determining
#' whether a country is democratic; not surprisingly, they display the lowest
#' correlation with the other dichotomous indicators of democracy. All of
#' these indexes have world-wide spatial scope, though they differ greatly in
#' temporal coverage. \code{doorenspleet}, \code{bmr_democracy}, `reign`, and
#' the "extended" versions of `magaloni_democracy`, `gwf_democracy`, and
#' `ulfelder_democracy` have the widest temporal scope, going all the way back
#' to the 19th century and in some cases beyond.
#'
#' @section Trichotomous indexes of democracy:
#'
#' Trichotomous indexes of democracy distinguish explicitly a "hybrid" or
#' "semi-democratic" category. These include the measure of democracy in
#' Central America developed by Bowman, Lehoucq, and Mahoney (\code{blm}, see
#' Bowman, Lehoucq, and Mahoney 2005), the trichotomous measure of democracy
#' in Latin America by Mainwaring, Brinks, and Perez Linan
#' (\code{mainwaring}), the "Political Regime Change" dataset (\code{prc},
#' omitting the code for "transition" in the original dataset) described in
#' Gasiorowski 1996 and extended in Reich 2002; and a couple of measures taken
#' from datasets of autocratic regimes that explicitly distinguish between
#' full democracies, electoral or multiparty autocracies, and other
#' autocracies (\code{utip_trichotomous}, \code{kailitz_tri}). Both \code{blm}
#' and \code{mainwaring} are regional indexes developed by scholars with
#' Latin-American expertise; the rest have world-wide scope. These correlate
#' with each other at levels ranging from 0.70 (`kailitz_tri` and `blm`) to
#' 0.9 (`blm` and `mainwaring`).
#'
#' @section Ordinal indexes of democracy:
#'
#' These indexes distinguish more than three "degrees" of democracy, but they
#' are not explicitly continuous. They include Freedom House's 14 category
#' freedom index (\code{fh_total_reversed}); the 7 category Lexical Index of
#' Democracy (\code{lexical_index}, from Skaaning, Gerring, Bartusevicius
#' 2015); a 5 category indicator of democracy used by the Political
#' Instability Task Force based on the \code{parcomp} and \code{exrec}
#' variables of the Polity dataset (\code{pitf}, described in Goldstone et al
#' 2010); the Polity IV \code{polity2} variable; a calculated variable from
#' Przeworski 2010 (`PIPE_regime` - use with care, as it may be incorrectly
#' calculated) Coppedge and Reinicke's Polyarchy index
#' (\code{polyarchy_original_contestation} and
#' \code{polyarchy_original_polyarchy}, from Coppedge and Reinicke 1991). Of
#' these, the Polyarchy measures are specialist measures that only cover 357
#' country-years, but the rest have worldwide scope, \code{polity} and
#' \code{lexical_index} go all the way back to the beginning of the 19th
#' century.
#'
#' Most of these indexes are meant to capture "thicker" conceptions of
#' democracy. The Freedom House measure puts some emphasis on civil and
#' political rights; Polity and PITF focus on differences in "authority
#' patterns" (though they tend to downplay the scope of participation);
#' Polyarchy tries to operationalize both the participation and contestation
#' dimensions of Dahl's "Polyarchy" concept; and LIED tries to incorporate the
#' degree of suffrage using measures originally collected for the PIPE dataset
#' (Prezeworski et al 2010). They correlate with one another at levels ranging
#' from 0.81 (\code{lexical_index} and \code{pitf}) to 0.94 (\code{polity2}
#' and \code{pitf}).
#'
#' @section Continuous indexes of democracy:
#'
#' These indexes conceptualize democracy as a continuous quantity, and usually
#' in "thicker" ways. They include Arat's measure of democracy
#' (\code{pmm_arat}, from Arat 1991); Bollen's index of democracy
#' (\code{pmm_bollen}, from Bollen 2001); the World Governance Indicator's
#' Index of voice and Acocuntability (\code{wgi_democracy}); Axel Hadenius'
#' index of democracy, from Hadenius 1992 (\code{pmm_hadenius}); Munck's
#' measure of democracy (\code{pmm_munck}); several variants of the
#' Participation-Enhanced Polity Scores (e.g., \code{PEPS1v}, from Moon et al
#' 2006); the calculated inclusion and contestation dimensions from Coppedge,
#' Alvarez, and Maldonado (2008) (`polyarchy_inclusion_dimension` and
#' `polyarchy_contestation_dimension`); several indexes from V-dem (e.g.
#' \code{v2x_polyarchy}); the posterior means and medians for the three
#' releases of the Unified Democracy scores (`uds_*`, Pemstein, Meserve, and
#' Melton 2010) and Vanahnen's index of democratization
#' (\code{vanhanen_democratization}). Of these, the Unified democracy indexes,
#' the V-Dem indexes, and the Polyarchy dimensions are themselves latent
#' variable indexes.
#'
#' Vanhanen and PEPS give special weight to participation in the measurement
#' of democracy; the WGI index combines a very wide variety of indicators of
#' democracy. Only Vanahanen, the V-dem measure, and PEPS have long temporal
#' coverage; the WGI Voice and Accountability index has broad spatial coverage
#' but is only available for a short time series. Arat and Bollen go back only
#' until the 1950s, though they do have reasonable spatial coverage.
#'
#' Correlations vary from a low of 0.26 (Munck and the WGI, 126 country-year
#' overlap, nonsignificant) to over 0.97 for various for V-Dem indexes. The
#' lowest correlations are typically with the WGI measure of democracy.
#'
#' @section Spatial and temporal organization:
#'
#' The state system is complicated, and not always amenable to presentation in
#' tabular form. Countries change name, split, get absorbed into larger units,
#' and are not always obviously independent. This dataset basically follows
#' the Gleditsch and Ward list of independent states (Gleditsch and Ward 1999,
#' updated by Gleditsch to 2013), supplemented by Gleditsch's tentative list
#' of microstates (available at
#' \url{http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/statelist.html}). The Gleditsch and
#' Ward list is very similar, but not identical, to the Correlates of War list
#' of independent states that is commonly used in Political Science and
#' International Relations research; in particular, the treatment of Germany,
#' Yemen, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Yugoslavia, Serbia, Montenegro, and a few other
#' countries and their successor states differs between them.
#'
#' I have included two different codes for each country-year: the Gleditsch
#' and Ward country code (\code{GWn}), and the COW code (\code{cown}), as well
#' as an indicator of whether the country year is considered to be "in the
#' international system" by Gleditsch and Ward (\code{in_GW_system}). Since
#' the Gleditsch and Ward "international system" begins with the Congress of
#' Vienna in 1816, country-years before 1816 are by definition not "in
#' system," even though this does not mean that these states were not
#' independent then. Care should thus be taken with the "in system" indicator
#' for years before 1816.
#'
#' It is worth noting that while most measures of democracy are produced only
#' for sovereign countries, a number of measures have also been produced,
#' either explicitly (the V-dem project, Freedom House) or not (sometimes
#' researchers do not agree on whether a country-year represents a "sovereign"
#' state), for non-sovereign territories. In fact in this dataset about 6415
#' country-years in or after 1816 are not "in system" (most of them from the
#' V-dem indexes of democracy); these are easily excluded by filtering the
#' dataset using the boolean \code{in_GW_system} indicator (or a logical
#' expression that filters data points that are not in system after 1816 but
#' includes those before 1816).
#'
#' All countries are measured as of 31 December of the given year, as is the
#' conventional rule. Some datasets do not use this rule (e.g., Freedom House,
#' Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014), and others sometimes contain more than
#' one data point per year (e.g., the Political Regime Change dataset); I have
#' tried my best to transform their coding so that all datapoints conform to
#' convention, but some errors may remain.
#'
#' @section A note on sources:
#'
#' Wherever possible, I have used the original sources for these measures of
#' democracy and put them in the right panel format myself. For details, see
#' the [democracyData](https://github.com/xmarquez/democracyData) package.
#' There are three exceptions.
#'
#' First, in a few cases I have relied on the replication data for Pemstein,
#' Meserve, and Melton (2010), which contains data I have not been able to
#' find elsewhere. These variables are marked \code{pmm_*}, and they are not
#' always perfectly correlated with the original data (where available). For
#' example, \code{fh_pmm} includes data for 1981, whereas
#' \code{fh_total_reversed} conventionally does not; and there are a number of
#' divergences between PMM's \code{pmm_prc} data and the \code{prc} dataset
#' available from Reich 2002 that seem to have something to do with the
#' treatment of country-years that include transition periods. A more extended
#' discussion of the differences between the PMM replication data and the
#' original data sources is available in a package vignette; see
#' \code{vignette("Differences_between_PMM_and_original_data")} for details.)
#'
#' Second, I have constructed the \code{PIPE_democracy}, `PIPE_regime`, and
#' \code{pitf*} variables following the instructions in the source, but have
#' not found the data ready-made. This is probably unproblematic in the case
#' of \code{pitf} -- the instructions are very clear -- but less so in the
#' case of \code{przeworski}, where the instructions are less clear and it is
#' difficult to produce a test that indicates whether the variable is properly
#' constructed. It is also worth noting that the Polity data is occasionally
#' revised, so that the \code{pitf} variable described and used in Goldstone
#' et al 2010 is probably different from the \code{pitf} variable here for a
#' small number of country-years. (Similarly, \code{pmm_polity} and
#' \code{polity2} differ in a few instances due to revisions of the Polity
#' data between 2010 and today.)
#'
#' Third, on at least one occasion I have recalculated an index from its
#' original sources in different ways (see the \code{utip_dichotomous},
#' \code{utip_dichotomous_strict}, and \code{utip_trichotomous} variables),
#' since the original data does not provide an unambiguous measure.
#'
#' @template standard-variables
#'
#' @section Democracy measures:
#'
#' \describe{
#'
#' \item{anckar_democracy}{The Anckar-Fredriksson 2018 measure of democracy,
#' as a numeric value. Up to 2010 this should be identical to
#' `bmr_democracy_omitteddata`. 0 = non-democracy, 1 = democracy.}
#'
#' \item{arat_pmm}{Democracy score from Arat 1991. Taken from Pemstein,
#' Meserve, and Melton 2013. Min = 29, max = 109, n = 3873.}
#'
#'
#' \item{blm}{Trichotomous measure of regime type from Bowman, Lehoucq, and
#' Mahoney 2005. 0 = authoritarian, 0.5 = semidemocratic, 1 = democratic.
#' Available only for five Latin American countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador,
#' Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) from 1900 to 2000.}
#'
#' \item{pmm_blm}{Same as previous but taken from Pemstein, Meserve, and
#' Melton 2013. 0 = authoritarian, 0.5 = semidemocratic, 1 = democratic.
#' Available only for five Latin American countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador,
#' Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) from 1946 to 2000 in this version.
#' Included here in order to replicate the original model from Pemstein,
#' Meserve, and Melton 2011.}
#'
#' \item{bmr_democracy}{Dichotomous measure of regime type from Boix, Miller,
#' and 2012, version 3.0. 1 = democracy, 0 = non-democracy. N = 16987.}
#'
#' \item{bmr_democracy_omitteddata}{Dichotomous measure of regime type from
#' Boix, Miller, and 2012, version 3.0. 1 = democracy, 0 = non-democracy. This
#' is the same measure as `bmr_democracy`, except it records an `NA` for
#' countries occupied during an international war (e.g., the Netherlands
#' 1940-44) or experiencing state collapse during a civil war (e.g., Lebanon
#' 1976-89). The democracy variable instead fills in these years as
#' continuations of the same regime type. N = 16762.}
#'
#' \item{bmr_democracy_femalesuffrage}{According to the BMR version 3.0
#' codebook, this is the same measure as `bmr_democracy`, except that it also
#' requires that at least half of adult women have the right to vote. 30
#' countries change values.}
#'
#' \item{bnr}{Dichotomous indicator of democracy from the Bernhard, Nordstrom
#' & Reenock 2001.}
#'
#' \item{bnr_extended}{Dichotomous indicator of democracy from the Bernhard,
#' Nordstrom & Reenock 2001. This version indicator has been put in
#' country-year format, extending to 1913, with the help of the Correlates of
#' War panel of independent states; independent countries (not microstates) in
#' this panel that were not included in the original dataset are assumed to be
#' non-democratic for the period. See
#' [democracyData](https://github.com/xmarquez/democracyData) for more
#' information about the additional country-years generated in this way.}
#'
#' \item{pmm_bollen}{0-100 index of democracy from Bollen 2001. Taken from
#' Pemstein, Meserve, and Melton 2013.}
#'
#' \item{doorenspleet}{Dichotomous index of democracy from Doorenspleet 2000.
#' 1 = authoritarian, 2 = democracy. Omits periods of interruption.}
#'
#' \item{eiu}{The Economist Intelligence Unit's democracy index.}
#'
#' \item{wgi_democracy}{Voice and Accountability index from the World
#' Governance Indicators. Taken from \url{http://www.govindicators.org}.}
#'
#' \item{fh_total_reversed}{Average civil liberties + political rights score
#' (reversed so higher values are more democratic) from Freedom House. 2018.
#' "Freedom in the World." Original data available at
#' \url{http://www.freedomhouse.org}. Goes from 0 (least democratic) to 13
#' (most democratic). In this version, the index does not include a value for
#' 1981. This is based on the latest Freedom House data going all the way to
#' 2017.}
#'
#' \item{pmm_fh}{Same as previous but taken from Pemstein, Meserve, and Melton
#' 2013. Goes from 1 (least democratic) to 7 (most democratic). In this
#' version the index stops at 2008. It also includes a value for 1981. For
#' more on the differences between this variable and the current FH Freedom in
#' the World index, see
#' [democracyData](https://github.com/xmarquez/democracyData).}
#'
#' \item{fh_electoral}{An indicator of whether a country is an "electoral
#' democracy" in Freedom House's estimation (1 = yes, 0 - no). Original data
#' available at \url{http://www.freedomhouse.org}. Available only from 1989.
#' This is based on the latest Freedom House electoral democracies list going
#' all the way to 2016.}
#'
#' \item{gwf_democracy}{Dichotmous democracy/autocracy indicator from Geddes,
#' Wright, and Frantz 2014. 0 = autocracy, 1 = democracy.}
#'
#' \item{gwf_democracy_extended}{Dichotmous democracy/autocracy indicator from
#' Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014. 0 = autocracy, 1 = democracy. Extended
#' beyond 1945 using Geddes, Wright, and Frantz's case variable, which encodes
#' information about the first year of the regime. For more detail on the
#' resulting additional country-years, see
#' [democracyData](https://github.com/xmarquez/democracyData).}
#'
#' \item{pmm_hadenius}{0-10 index of democracy from Hadenius 1992. Taken from
#' Pemstein, Meserve, and Melton 2013. Higher values are more democratic.}
#'
#' \item{kailitz_binary}{Dichotomous democracy indicator from Kailitz 2013. 0
#' = autocracy (all types including electoral autocracy), 1 = liberal
#' democracy.}
#'
#' \item{kailitz_tri}{Trichotomous democracy indicator from Kailitz 2013. 0 =
#' autocracy (all types except electoral autocracy), 1 = electoral autocracy,
#' 2 = liberal democracy.}
#'
#' \item{lexical_index}{0-6 Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy from
#' Skaaning, Gerring, and Bartusevicius 2015. This is from V3 of the dataset,
#' updated to 2015.
#'
#' 0 = nonelectoral,
#'
#' 1 = one- or no- party elections,
#'
#' 2 = limited competition multiparty elections for legislature only,
#'
#' 3 = Limited competition multiparty elections for both executive and
#' legislature,
#'
#' 4 = Competitive elections for executive and legislative, limited suffrage,
#'
#' 5 = Male democracy,
#'
#' 6 = Electoral democracy.}
#'
#' \item{magaloni_democracy}{Dichotomous democracy indicator from Magaloni,
#' Chu, and Min 2013. 0 = autocracy (all types including multiparty
#' autocracy), 1 = democracy.}
#'
#' \item{magaloni_democracy_extended}{Dichotomous democracy indicator from
#' Magaloni, Chu, and Min 2013. 0 = autocracy (all types including multiparty
#' autocracy), 1 = democracy. Extended beyond 1950 using the
#' \code{duration_nr} variable of the original dataset, which encodes
#' information about the first year of each regime. For more detail on the
#' resulting additional country-years, see
#' [democracyData](https://github.com/xmarquez/democracyData).}
#'
#' \item{mainwaring}{Trichotomous democracy indicator from Mainwaring, Brinks,
#' and Perez Linan 2008. 0 = non-democracy, 0.5 = hybrid, 1 = democracy.}
#'
#' \item{pmm_mainwaring}{Same as previous but taken from Pemstein, Meserve,
#' and Melton 2013. In this version the indicator goes only to 1945, and it is
#' missing some country-years. -1 = non-democracy, 0 = hybrid, 1 = democracy.
#' For more on the differences between this variable and the original
#' Mainwaring et al data, see
#' \code{vignette("Differences_between_PMM_and_original_data")}. Included in
#' order to replicate the original PMM 2010 model.}
#'
#'
#' \item{pmm_munck}{0-1 index of democracy from Munck 2009. Taken from
#' Pemstein, Meserve, and Melton 2013. Only available for 342 country-years.
#' Higher values are more democratic.}
#'
#' \item{pacl}{Dichotomous measure of democracy from Cheibub, Gandhi, and
#' Vreeland 2010. 1= democracy, 0 = non-democracy.}
#'
#' \item{pmm_pacl}{Same as previous but taken from Pemstein, Meserve, and
#' Melton 2013. This is missing a couple of countries in the original dataset;
#' for more detail on the missing cases, see
#' \code{vignette("Differences_between_PMM_and_original_data")}.}
#'
#' \item{PEPS1i}{Participation-Enhanced Polity Score 1, polity score adjusted
#' using IDEA Votes/Voting age population. From Moon et al. (2006).}
#'
#' \item{PEPS2i}{Participation-Enhanced Polity Score 2, polity score adjusted
#' using IDEA Votes/Voting age population. From Moon et al. (2006).}
#'
#' \item{PEPS1v}{Participation-Enhanced Polity Score 1, polity score adjusted
#' using Vanhanen votes/two-thirds of Vanhanen population. From Moon et al.
#' (2006).}
#'
#' \item{PEPS2v}{Participation-Enhanced Polity Score 2, polity score adjusted
#' using Vanhanen votes/two-thirds of Vanhanen population. From Moon et al.
#' (2006).}
#'
#' \item{PEPS1q}{Participation-Enhanced Polity Score 1, polity score adjusted
#' using (mostly)IDEA votes/Voting age population, with participation coded
#' zero for noncompetitive elections. From Moon et al. (2006).}
#'
#' \item{PEPS2q}{Participation-Enhanced Polity Score 2, polity score adjusted
#' using (mostly)IDEA votes/Voting age population, with participation coded
#' zero for noncompetitive elections. From Moon et al. (2006).}
#'
#' \item{pitf}{A five category indicator of democracy described in Goldstone
#' et al 2010. Can be:
#'
#' 0-Full autocracy (`exrec` < 7, `parcomp` !=0 and `parcomp` < 3)
#'
#' 1-Partial autocracy (`exrec` < 7, `parcomp` = 0 or `parcomp` > 2)
#'
#' 2-Partial democracy with factionalism (`exrec` > 6, `parcomp` = 3)
#'
#' 3-Partial democracy (`exrec` > 6, `parcomp` = 0 or `parcomp` = 4 or
#' `parcomp` = 5 but `exrec` != 8)
#'
#' 4-Full democracy (`exrec` = 8, `parcomp` = 5). See Goldstone et al. 2010
#' for full details.}
#'
#' \item{pitf_binary}{A simplification of the \code{pitf} indicator of
#' democracy described in Taylor and Ulfelder 2015. A country is a democracy
#' (1) "if its chief executive is chosen in competitive elections (`exrec`
#' equal to 7 or 8) and political competition is not suppressed (`parcomp`
#' equal to 0 or `parcomp` greater than 2)" Otherwise it is a non-democracy
#' (0).}
#'
#' \item{polity}{Annual polity index, excluding special codes for
#' interruption, interregnum, and transition (-88,-77,-66). Higher values are
#' more democratic. From Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2015.}
#'
#' \item{polity2}{Annual polity2 index, interpolating values for interruption,
#' interregnum, and transition periods. Higher values are more democratic.
#' From Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2015.}
#'
#' \item{polity_pmm}{Same as previous, but taken from Pemstein, Meserve, and
#' Melton 2013. In this version the indicator only goes to 1945, and it
#' differs from \code{polity2} in a few cases. For more detail on the
#' differences, see
#' \code{vignette("Differences_between_PMM_and_original_data")}. Included only
#' in order to be able to replicate the PMM 2011 model.}
#'
#' \item{polyarchy_original_polyarchy}{0-10 index of democracy from Coppedge
#' and Reinicke 1991. Revised in 2003-2006. This has been reversed so that
#' higher values are more democratic; the original index was scored so that 0
#' was less democratic. The codebook for the dataset suggests using
#' \code{polyarchy_original_contestation} instead, a more reliable version of
#' the polyarchy scale with fewer categories. Includes a value for Western
#' Sahara in 2000, which has been assigned COW code 605; Western Sahara is not
#' coded by any other dataset in this compilation, and is not considered an
#' independent state by either Gleditsch and Ward or the Correlates of War
#' project. Exclude if necessary.}
#'
#' \item{pmm_polyarchy}{Same as \code{polyarchy_reversed} but taken from
#' Pemstein, Meserve, and Melton 2013. Note that there are 22 discrepancies
#' between \code{polyarchy_reversed} and \code{polyarchy_pmm}; these appear to
#' be due to transcription error in PMM's replication dataset.
#' \code{pmm_polyarchy} also misses 4 country-years in
#' \code{polyarchy_original_polyarchy}. For more detail on the differences,
#' see \code{vignette("Differences_between_PMM_and_original_data")}. Included
#' only in order to be able to replicate the PMM 2011 model.}
#'
#' \item{polyarchy_original_contestation}{1-9 index of contestation from the
#' revised version of Coppedge and Reinicke. 1991. Revised in 2003-2006.
#' Includes a value for Western Sahara in 2000, which has been assigned code
#' 605; Western Sahara is not coded by any other dataset in this compilation,
#' and is not considered an independent state by either Gleditsch and Ward or
#' the Correlates of War project. Meaning of the scale is as follows:
#'
#' 9 Meaningful fair elections are held, there is full freedom for political
#' organization and expression, and there is no preferential presentation of
#' official views in the media.
#'
#' 8 Meaningful fair elections are held and there is full freedom for
#' political organization and expression, but there is preferential
#' presentation of official views in the media.
#'
#' 7 Meaningful fair elections are held and there is full freedom for
#' political organization, but some public dissent is suppressed and there is
#' preferential presentation of official views in the media.
#'
#' 6 Meaningful fair elections are held, but some independent political
#' organizations are banned, some public dissent is suppressed, and there is
#' preferential presentation of official views in the media.
#'
#' 5 Elections are marred by fraud or coercion, some independent political
#' organizations are banned, some public dissent is suppressed, and there is
#' preferential presentation of official views in the media.
#'
#' 4 Like score 5 except that there is less contestation in one or two of the
#' following respects: no meaningful elections are held, only nonpolitical
#' organizations are allowed to be independent, or alternatives to the
#' official media are very limited.
#'
#' 3 No meaningful elections are held, only nonpolitical organizations are
#' allowed to be independent, some public dissent is suppressed, and
#' alternatives to the official media are very limited.
#'
#' 2 Like score 3 except that there is less contestation in one or two of the
#' following respects: all organizations are banned or controlled by the
#' government or official party, all public dissent is suppressed, or there is
#' no public alternative to official information.
#'
#' 1 No meaningful elections are held, all organizations are banned or
#' controlled by the government or official party, all public dissent is
#' suppressed, and there is no public alternative to official information.}
#'
#' \item{polyarchy_contestation_dimension}{The contestation dimension
#' (`CONTEST`) in the dataset described in Coppedge, Alvarez, and Maldonado
#' 2008.}
#'
#' \item{polyarchy_inclusion_dimension}{The inclusion dimension (`INCLUS`) in
#' the dataset described in Coppedge, Alvarez, and Maldonado 2008.}
#'
#' \item{prc}{Trichotomous index of democracy from Gasiorowski 1996. Available
#' in updated form in Reich 2002. 1= Authoritarian, 3 = semidemocratic, 4 =
#' democratic. Transitional categories coded `NA`.}
#'
#' \item{pmm_prc}{Same as previous but taken from Pemstein, Meserve, and
#' Melton 2013. In this version the indicator only goes to 1945. It also
#' differs from the original data in a few cases (including the fact that it
#' includes the transition category, coded `NA` in `prc`). For more detail on
#' the differences, see For more detail on the differences, see
#' \code{vignette("Differences_between_PMM_and_original_data")}. Included only
#' in order to be able to replicate the PMM 2011 model.}
#'
#' \item{PIPE_regime}{Calculated regime type variable from the PIPE dataset.
#' Przeworski et al. 2013. This variable is not found in the downloadable
#' dataset; it is calculated according to the instructions in the codebook.
#' The documentation gives the following instructions:
#'
#' "0 if \code{electoral_age} (a variable in the original dataset) is missing.
#' There are two distinct reasons why it may be missing: either elections are
#' not held regularly or they are held but the winner does not complete a term
#' in office or makes an autocoup. Elections are considered not to be held if
#' (1) there is a constitution that specifies the length of term of the chief
#' executive (or the legislature) and this period is exceeded by more than one
#' year, except for war years, (2) there is no constitution or the
#' constitution does not provide for elections and no elections are held
#' during this period.
#'
#' 1 if \code{electoral_age} is not missing and \code{opposition = 0} (a
#' variable in the original dataset) (or \code{republic_age} is missing).
#' These are regimes in which elections are held regularly and the winners (or
#' their constitutional successors) complete electoral terms but either
#' elections are uncontested or there is one party and independents or parties
#' are banned and everyone runs as independent. Note that if everyone runs as
#' independents it is possible for the incumbent government to lose an
#' election, as in Swaziland in 1993. It is also possible for the incumbent to
#' lose if the regime had no opposition up to some time when a competitive
#' election occurred but the winner did not complete a term, as in Honduras in
#' 1852. Finally, incumbents can lose when \code{regime = 1} if the election
#' was competitive but at the end of the year the opposition was suppressed,
#' as in Panama in 1968.
#'
#' 2 if \code{republic_age} (a variable in the original dataset) is not
#' missing, that is if \code{electoral_age} is not missing and
#' \code{opposition = 1} (there is some minimal opposition), but no strong
#' alternation has ocurred (power has not changed hands).
#'
#' 3 if \code{democracy_age} (\code{democracy_age} is not found in the
#' original dataset) is not missing, that is, the country has elections, there
#' is opposition, and a strong alternation -- a change in parties controlling
#' the government -- has occurred."}
#'
#' \item{reign_democracy}{A measure of democracy from Bell 2016, obtained by
#' coding all presidential and parliamentary democracies as 1, all other
#' regimes as 0.}
#'
#' \item{csvmdi}{The continuous Support Vector Machine democracy index from
#' Grundler and Krieger 2018.}
#'
#' \item{svmdi_2016}{The continuous Support Vector Machine democracy index
#' from Grundler and Krieger 2016.}
#'
#' \item{dsvmdi}{The dichotomous Support Vector Machine democracy index from
#' Grundler and Krieger 2018.}
#'
#' \item{svolik_democracy}{Dichotomous indicator of democracy from Svolik
#' 2012. 0 = authoritarian, 1 = democracy.}
#'
#' \item{ulfelder_democracy}{Dichotomous indicator of democracy from Ulfelder
#' 2012. 0 = authoritarian, 1 = democracy.}
#'
#' \item{ulfelder_democracy_extended}{Dichotomous indicator of democracy from
#' Ulfelder 2012. 0 = authoritarian, 1 = democracy, extended back in time
#' using the regime duration information in the dataset. For more details on
#' the additional country-years coded this way, see
#' [democracyData](https://github.com/xmarquez/democracyData)}
#'
#' \item{utip_dichotomous}{Calculated dichotomous index of democracy from data
#' in the UTIP dataset of political regimes (Hsu 2008). 1 if the regime is a
#' social democracy, conservative democracy, or one party democracy, 0
#' otherwise. The category of "one party democracy" is not well documented.}
#'
#' \item{utip_dichotomous_strict}{Stricter version of the calculated
#' dichotomous index of democracy from data in the UTIP dataset of political
#' regimes (Hsu 2008). 1 if the regime is a social democracy or a conservative
#' democracy, 0 otherwise. This excludes "one party democracies" from the
#' democracy category.}
#'
#' \item{utip_trichotomous}{Calculated trichotomous index of democracy from
#' data in the UTIP dataset of political regimes (Hsu 2008). 2 if the regime
#' is a social democracy or conservative democracy, 1 if the regime is a one
#' party democracy, 0 otherwise. The category of "one party democracy" is not
#' well documented.}
#'
#' \item{v2x_api}{Additive polyarchy index from V-dem version 7.1, Coppedge et
#' al 2017.Higher values are more democratic.}
#'
#' \item{v2x_delibdem}{Deliberative democracy index from V-dem version 7.1,
#' Coppedge et al 2017.Higher values are more democratic.}
#'
#' \item{v2x_egaldem}{Egalitarian democracy index from V-dem version 7.1,
#' Coppedge et al 2017.Higher values are more democratic.}
#'
#' \item{v2x_libdem}{Egalitarian democracy index from V-dem version 7.1,
#' Coppedge et al 2017.Higher values are more democratic.}
#'
#' \item{v2x_mpi}{Multiplicative polyarchy index from V-dem version 7.1,
#' Coppedge et al 2017.Higher values are more democratic.}
#'
#' \item{v2x_partipdem}{Participatory democracy index from V-dem version 7.1,
#' Coppedge et al 2017.Higher values are more democratic.}
#'
#' \item{v2x_polyarchy}{Continuous polyarchy index from V-dem version 7.1,
#' Coppedge et al 2017.Higher values are more democratic.}
#'
#' \item{vanhanen_competition}{Index of competition from Vanhanen 2012. From
#' Vanahnen's documentation: "The smaller parties' share of the votes cast in
#' parliamentary or presidential elections, or both, is used to indicate the
#' degree of competition. It is calculated by subtracting the percentage of
#' votes won by the largest party from 100. If the largest party gets, for
#' example, 40 percent of the votes, the share of the smaller parties is 60
#' percent. If data on the distribution of votes are not available, the value
#' of this variable is calculated on the basis of the distribution of seats in
#' parliament. The distribution of seats is used also in cases in which it
#' seems to indicate power relations more realistically than the distribution
#' of votes." Its maximum value is 70. See the full documentation for
#' Vanhanen's dataset for details.}
#'
#' \item{vanhanen_participation}{Index of participation from Vanhanen 2012.
#' From Vanahnen's documentation: "The percentage of the population which
#' actually voted in the same elections is used to measure the degree of
#' participation (= Participation). This percentage is calculated from the
#' total population, not from the adult or enfranchized population." It is
#' zero by construction in cases where no popular elections exist. May be
#' modified by referenda. See the full documentation of Vanhanen's dataset for
#' details.}
#'
#' \item{vanhanen_democratization}{Index of democratization from Vanhanen
#' 2012. Higher values are more democratic. Constructed multiplicatively from
#' \code{vanhanen_participation} and \code{vanhanen_competition}.}
#'
#' \item{pmm_vanhanen}{Same as \code{vanhanen_democratization} but taken from
#' Pemstein, Meserve, and Melton. 2013. There are some small differences
#' between this variable and `vanhanen_democratization`. For more detail on
#' the differences, see
#' \code{vignette("Differences_between_PMM_and_original_data")}. Included only
#' in order to be able to replicate the PMM 2011 model exactly.}
#'
#' \item{wth_democ1}{Dichotomous measure of democracy from Wahman, Teorell,
#' and Hadenius 2013, obtaining by coding 1 all democracies according to the
#' `regime1ny` variable, 0 all other regimes.}
#'
#' \item{wth_democrobust}{Dichotomous measure of democracy from Wahman,
#' Teorell, and Hadenius 2013, obtaining by coding 1 all democracies according
#' to the `regimenyrobust` variable, 0 all other regimes.}
#'
#' }
#'
#' @references
#'
#' Anckar, Carsten and C. Fredriksson. 2018. "Classifying political regimes
#' 1800-2016: a typology and a new dataset". European Political Science. DOI:
#' 10.1057/s41304-018-0149-8. Data and codebook available at
#' \url{https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-018-0149-8}.
#'
#' Arat, Zehra F. 1991. Democracy and human rights in developing countries.
#' Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
#'
#' Bernhard, Michael Timothy Nordstrom, and Christopher Reenock, "Economic
#' Performance, Institutional Intermediation and Democratic Breakdown," Journal
#' of Politics 63:3 (2001), pp. 775-803. Data and coding description available
#' at \url{http://users.clas.ufl.edu/bernhard/content/data/data.htm}
#'
#' Bell 2016. The Rulers, Elections, and Irregular Governance Dataset (REIGN).
#' OEF research. Data available at \url{http://oefresearch.org/datasets/reign}
#'
#' Boix, Carles, Michael Miller, and Sebastian Rosato. 2012. A Complete Data Set
#' of Political Regimes, 1800-2007. Comparative Political Studies 46 (12):
#' 1523-1554. Original data available at
#' \url{https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/FJLMKT}
#'
#' Bollen, Kenneth A. 2001. "Cross-National Indicators of Liberal Democracy,
#' 1950-1990." 2nd ICPSR version. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina,
#' 1998. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
#' Research, 2001. Original data available at
#' \url{http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-STUDY/02532.xml}.
#'
#' Bowman, Kirk, Fabrice Lehoucq, and James Mahoney. 2005. Measuring Political
#' Democracy: Case Expertise, Data Adequacy, and Central America. Comparative
#' Political Studies 38 (8): 939-970.
#' \url{http://cps.sagepub.com/content/38/8/939}. Data available at
#' \url{http://www.blmdemocracy.gatech.edu/}.
#'
#' Cheibub, Jose Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2010.
#' "Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited." Public Choice. 143(1):67-101.
#' Original data available at
#' \url{https://sites.google.com/site/joseantoniocheibub/datasets/democracy-and-dictatorship-revisited}.
#'
#' Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning,
#' and Jan Teorell, with David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Adam
#' Glynn, Allen Hicken, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Kelly McMann, Pamela Paxton, Daniel
#' Pemstein, Jeffrey Staton, Brigitte Zimmerman, Frida Andersson, Valeriya
#' Mechkova, Farhad Miri. 2017. V-Dem Codebook v7.1. Varieties of Democracy
#' (V-Dem) Project. Original data available at \url{https://v-dem.net/en/data/}.
#'
#' Coppedge, Michael, Angel Alvarez and Claudia Maldonado. 2008 "Two Persistent
#' Dimensions of Democracy: Contestation and Inclusiveness".The Journal of
#' Politics 70(03), pp. 632-647. DOI: 10.1017/S0022381608080663. Original data
#' available at \url{https://www3.nd.edu/~mcoppedg/crd/datacrd.htm}.
#'
#' Coppedge, Michael and Wolfgang H. Reinicke. 1991. Measuring Polyarchy. In On
#' Measuring Democracy: Its Consequences and Concomitants, ed. Alex Inkeles. New
#' Brunswuck, NJ: Transaction pp. 47-68. Original data available at
#' \url{https://www3.nd.edu/~mcoppedg/crd/datacrd.htm}.
#'
#' Doorenspleet, Renske. 2000. Reassessing the Three Waves of Democratization.
#' World Politics 52 (03): 384-406. DOI: 10.1017/S0043887100016580.
#' \url{http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0043887100016580}.
#'
#' Freedom House. 2018. "Freedom in the World." Original data available at
#' \url{http://www.freedomhouse.org}.
#'
#' Gasiorowski, Mark J. 1996. "An Overview of the Political Regime Change
#' Dataset." Comparative Political Studies 29(4):469-483.
#'
#' Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. 2014. Autocratic Breakdown
#' and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set. Perspectives on Politics 12 (1):
#' 313-331. Original data available at \url{http://dictators.la.psu.edu/}.
#'
#' Gleditsch, Kristian S. & Michael D. Ward. 1999. "Interstate System
#' Membership: A Revised List of the Independent States since 1816."
#' International Interactions 25: 393-413. The list can be found at
#' \url{http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/statelist.html}
#'
#' Goldstone, Jack, Robert Bates, David Epstein, Ted Gurr, Michael Lustik, Monty
#' Marshall, Jay Ulfelder, and Mark Woodward. 2010. A Global Model for
#' Forecasting Political Instability. American Journal of Political Science 54
#' (1): 190-208. DOI:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00426.x
#'
#' Grundler, K. and T. Krieger. 2018. "Machine Learning Indices, Political
#' Institutions, and Economic Development". Report. CESifo Group Munich, 2018.
#' \url{https://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp6930.pdf}.
#'
#' Grundler, K. and T. Krieger. 2016. "Democracy and growth: Evidence from a
#' machine learning indicator". European Journal of Political Economy 45, pp.
#' 85-107. DOI: \url{https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.05.005}.
#'
#' Hadenius, Axel. 1992. Democracy and Development. Cambridge: Cambridge
#' University Press.
#'
#' Hadenius, Axel & Jan Teorell. 2007. "Pathways from Authoritarianism", Journal
#' of Democracy 18(1): 143-156.
#'
#' Hsu, Sara "The Effect of Political Regimes on Inequality, 1963-2002," UTIP
#' Working Paper No. 53 (2008),
#' \url{http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/papers/utip_53.pdf}. Data available for
#' download at \url{http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/data/}.
#'
#' Kailitz, Steffen. 2013. Classifying political regimes revisited: legitimation
#' and durability. Democratization 20 (1): 39-60. Original data available at
#' \url{http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2013.738861}.
#'
#' Mainwaring, Scott, Daniel Brinks, and Anibal Perez Linan. 2008. "Political
#' Regimes in Latin America, 1900-2007." Original data available from
#' \url{http://kellogg.nd.edu/scottmainwaring/Political_Regimes.pdf}.
#'
#' Magaloni, Beatriz, Jonathan Chu, and Eric Min. 2013. Autocracies of the
#' World, 1950-2012 (Version 1.0). Dataset, Stanford University. Original data
#' and codebook available at
#' \url{http://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/research/autocracies_of_the_world_dataset/}
#'
#' Marshall, Monty G., Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers. 2012. "Polity IV:
#' Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2012." Updated to
#' 2015. Original data available from
#' \url{http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm}.
#'
#' Moon, Bruce E., Jennifer Harvey Birdsall, Sylvia Ceisluk, Lauren M. Garlett,
#' Joshua J. Hermias, Elizabeth Mendenhall, Patrick D. Schmid, and Wai Hong Wong
#' (2006) "Voting Counts: Participation in the Measurement of Democracy" Studies
#' in Comparative International Development 42, 2 (Summer, 2006). The complete
#' dataset is available here:
#' \url{http://www.lehigh.edu/~bm05/democracy/Obtain_data.htm}.
#'
#' Munck, Gerardo L. 2009. Measuring Democracy: A Bridge Between Scholarship and
#' Politics. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
#'
#' Pemstein, Daniel, Stephen Meserve, and James Melton. 2010. Democratic
#' Compromise: A Latent Variable Analysis of Ten Measures of Regime Type.
#' Political Analysis 18 (4): 426-449.
#'
#' Pemstein, Daniel, Stephen A. Meserve, and James Melton. 2013. "Replication
#' data for: Democratic Compromise: A Latent Variable Analysis of Ten Measures
#' of Regime Type." In: Harvard Dataverse.
#' \url{http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/PMM}
#'
#' Przeworski, Adam et al. 2013. Political Institutions and Political Events
#' (PIPE) Data Set. Department of Politics, New York University.
#' \url{https://sites.google.com/a/nyu.edu/adam-przeworski/home/data}
#'
#' Reich, G. 2002. Categorizing Political Regimes: New Data for Old Problems.
#' Democratization 9 (4): 1-24.
#' \url{http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/714000289}.
#'
#' Skaaning, Svend-Erik, John Gerring, and Henrikas Bartusevicius. 2015. A
#' Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy. Comparative Political Studies 48 (12):
#' 1491-1525. Original data available from
#' \url{http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/skaaning}.
#'
#' Svolik, Milan. 2012. The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. Cambridge and New
#' York: Cambridge University Press. Original data available from
#' \url{http://campuspress.yale.edu/svolik/the-politics-of-authoritarian-rule/}.
#'
#' Taylor, Sean J. and Ulfelder, Jay, A Measurement Error Model of Dichotomous
#' Democracy Status (May 20, 2015). Available at SSRN:
#' \url{http://ssrn.com/abstract=2726962} or
#' \url{http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2726962}
#'
#' The Economist Intelligence Unit. 2018. Democracy Index 2017: Free Speech under Attack.
#'
#' Ulfelder, Jay. 2012. "Democracy/Autocracy Data Set." In: Harvard Dataverse.
#' \url{http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/18836}.
#'
#' Vanhanen, Tatu. 2012. "FSD1289 Measures of Democracy 1810-2012." Original
#' data available from
#' \url{http://www.fsd.uta.fi/english/data/catalogue/FSD1289/meF1289e.html}
#'
#' Wahman, Michael, Jan Teorell, and Axel Hadenius. 2013. Authoritarian regime
#' types revisited: updated data in comparative perspective. Contemporary
#' Politics 19 (1): 19-34.
#' @family democracy
#' @author Xavier Marquez, Political Science and International Relations
#' Programme, Victoria University of Wellington, marquez.x@gmail.com
"democracy"
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