The theory of cooperative games with transferable utility offers useful insights into the way parties can share gains from cooperation and secure sustainable agreements, see e.g. one of the books by Chakravarty, Mitra and Sarkar (2015, ISBN:9781107058798) or by Driessen (1988, ISBN:9789027727299) for more details. A comprehensive set of tools for cooperative game theory with transferable utility is provided. Users can create special families of cooperative games, like e.g. bankruptcy games, cost sharing games and weighted voting games. There are functions to check various game properties and to compute five different setvalued solution concepts for cooperative games. A large number of pointvalued solution concepts is available reflecting the diverse application areas of cooperative game theory. Some of these pointvalued solution concepts can be used to analyze weighted voting games and measure the influence of individual voters within a voting body. There are routines for visualizing both setvalued and pointvalued solutions in the case of three or four players.
Package details 


Author  Jochen Staudacher [aut, cre, cph], Johannes Anwander [aut, cph], Alexandra Tiukkel [aut, cph], Michael Maerz [aut, cph], Franz Mueller [aut, cph], Daniel Gebele [aut, cph], Anna Merkle [aut, cph], Fatma Tokay [aut, cph], Kuebra Tokay [aut, cph], Nicole Cyl [aut, cph] 
Maintainer  Jochen Staudacher <jochen.staudacher@hskempten.de> 
License  GPL2 
Version  0.2.2 
Package repository  View on CRAN 
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