BR: BR dynamic

In EvolutionaryGames: Important Concepts of Evolutionary Game Theory

BR dynamic

Description

Best response dynamic as a type of evolutionary dynamics.

Usage

BR(time, state, parameters)

Arguments

time	Regular sequence that represents the time sequence under which simulation takes place.
state	Numeric vector that represents the initial state.
parameters	Numeric vector that represents parameters needed by the dynamic.

Value

Numeric list. Each component represents the rate of change depending on the dynamic.

Author(s)

Daniel Gebele [e-mail]

References

Gilboa, I. and Matsui, A. (1991) "Social Stability and Equilibrium", Econometrica 59, pp. 859–867.

Examples

dynamic <- BR
A <- matrix(c(0, -2, 1, 1, 0, -2, -2, 1, 0), 3, byrow=TRUE)
state <- matrix(c(0.4, 0.3, 0.3), 1, 3, byrow=TRUE)
phaseDiagram3S(A, dynamic, NULL, state, FALSE, FALSE)

EvolutionaryGames documentation built on Aug. 29, 2022, 1:06 a.m.