rel_spe: Finds an optimal simple subgame perfect equilibrium of g....

In skranz/RelationalContracts: Characterize relational contracts in repated or stochastic games

Description

Finds an optimal simple subgame perfect equilibrium of g. From this the whole SPE payoff set can be deduced.

Usage

rel_spe(
  g,
  delta = g$param$delta,
  tol.feasible = 1e-10,
  no.exist.action = c("warn", "stop", "nothing"),
  verbose = FALSE,
  r1 = NULL,
  r2 = NULL,
  rho = g$param$rho,
  add.action.labels = TRUE,
  max.iter = 10000,
  first.best = FALSE
)

Arguments

g	the game object
delta	The discount factor. By default the discount factor specified in g.
tol.feasible	Due to numerical inaccuracies, sometimes incentive constraints which theoretically should exactly hold, seem to be violated. To avoid this problem, we will consider all action profiles feasible whose incentive constraint is not violated by more then tol.feasible. This means we compute epsilon equilibria in which tol.feasible is the epsilon.
no.exist.action	What shall be done if no pure SPE exists? Default is no.exist.action = "warning", alternatives are no.exist.action = "error" or no.exist.action = "nothing".
verbose	if TRUE give more detailed information over the solution process.
r1	(or r2) if not NULL we want to find a SPE in a truncated game. Then r1 and r2 need to specify for each state the exogenously fixed negotiation payoffs.
rho	Only relevant if r1 and r2 are not null. In that case the negotiation probability.

skranz/RelationalContracts documentation built on March 6, 2021, 11:54 a.m.