R/polity_annual_doc.R

In xmarquez/AuthoritarianismBook: Replication Package for the Book Non-Democratic Politics by Xavier Marquez

#' Selection from the POLITY IV dataset
#'
#' A selection of variables from the Polity IV dataset (case and country-year
#' formats). See Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, Keith Jaggers, 2014. POLITY
#' IV PROJECT: Dataset Users' Manual. Center for Systemic Peace. Original dataset
#' and codebook available at www.systemicpeace.org. Documentation below is
#' directly derived form this codebook.
#'
#' @section Variable descriptions:
#'
#' \describe{ \item{country_name}{Standardized country name. This is the same
#' across all datasets in this package, so you can always join them by
#' country_name and year. Character with 186 distinct values. Most common:
#' Afghanistan (216), Austria (216), China (216), Denmark (216), France (216),
#' Iran (Persia) (216), Japan (216), Nepal (216), Oman (216), Portugal (216),
#' Russia (Soviet Union) (216), Spain (216), Sweden (216), Thailand (216), Turkey
#' (Ottoman Empire) (216), United Kingdom (216), United States of America (216).
#' NAs = 0.}
#'
#'
#' \item{GWn}{Gleditsch-Ward numeric country code. See Gleditsch and Ward (1999).
#' Numeric. Max = 950, min = 2, distinct = 186, mean = 402.93, sd = 249.457, NAs =
#' 0.}
#'
#'
#' \item{year}{Year. Numeric. Max = 2015, min = 1800, distinct = 216, mean =
#' 1938.894, sd = 59.439, NAs = 0.}
#'
#'
#' \item{polity}{Combined Polity Score. The codebook says this: "The POLITY score
#' is computed by subtracting the AUTOC score from the DEMOC score; the resulting
#' unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly
#' autocratic). Note: The POLITY score was added to the Polity IV data series in
#' recognition of its common usage by users in quantitative research and in the
#' overriding interest of maintaining uniformity among users in this application.
#' The simple combination of the original DEMOC and AUTOC index values in a
#' unitary POLITY scale, in many ways, runs contrary to the original theory stated
#' by Eckstein and Gurr in Patterns of Authority (1975) and, so, should be treated
#' and interpreted with due caution Its primary utility is in investigative
#' research which should be augmented by more detailed analysis. The original
#' theory posits that autocratic and democratic authority are distinct patterns of
#' authority, elements of which may co-exist in any particular regime context. The
#' inclusion of this variable in the data series should not be seen as an
#' acceptance of the counter-proposal that autocracy and democracy are
#' alternatives or opposites in a unified authority spectrum, even though elements
#' of this perspective may be implied in the original theory. The POLITY variable
#' provides a convenient avenue for examining general regime effects in analyses
#' but researchers should note that the middle of the implied POLITY "spectrum" is
#' somewhat muddled in terms of the original theory, masking various combinations
#' of DEMOC and AUTOC scores with the same POLITY score. Investigations involving
#' hypotheses of varying effects of democracy and/or autocracy should employ the
#' original Polity scheme and test DEMOC and AUTOC separately." Numeric. Max = 10,
#' min = -88, distinct = 24, mean = -4.08, sd = 17.67, NAs = 0.}
#'
#'
#' \item{polity2}{Revised Combined Polity Score: This variable "modifies the
#' combined annual POLITY score by applying a simple treatment, or "fix," to
#' convert instances of "standardized authority scores" (i.e., -66, -77, and -88)
#' to conventional polity scores (i.e., within the range, -10 to +10). The values
#' have been converted according to the following rule set:
#'
#' -66 Cases of foreign "interruption" are treated as "system missing."
#'
#' -77 Cases of "interregnum," or anarchy, are converted to a "neutral" Polity
#' score of "0."
#'
#' -88 Cases of "transition" are prorated across the span of the transition. For
#' example, country X has a POLITY score of -7 in 1957, followed by three years of
#' -88 and, finally, a score of +5 in 1961. The change (+12) would be prorated
#' over the intervening three years at a rate of per year, so that the converted
#' scores would be as follows: 1957 -7; 1958 -4; 1959 -1; 1960 +2; and 1961 +5.
#'
#' Note: Ongoing (-88) transitions in the most recent year are converted to
#' "system missing" values. Transitions (-88) following a year of independence,
#' interruption (-66), or interregnum (-77) are prorated from the value "0.""
#' Numeric. Max = 10, min = -10, distinct = 22, mean = -0.596, sd = 7.067, NAs =
#' 235.}
#'
#'
#' \item{exrec}{Executive recruitment. 1 = Ascription, 2 = ascription +
#' designation, 3 = designation, 4 = self-selection, 5 = executive-guided
#' transition, 6 = dual - ascription + election, 7 = transitional or restricted
#' elections, 8 = competitive elections. (-88 = transition, -77 = interregnum, -66
#' foreign interruption). See official Polity codebook for further detail. Factor
#' with 11 levels. Most common: Ascription (2622), Dual Executive (Designation)
#' (1208), Designation (4014), Self-Selection (1428), Gradual Transition from
#' Self-Selection (446), Transitional or Restricted Election (1143), Competitive
#' Election (5083). NAs = 201.}
#'
#'
#' \item{exconst}{Executive constraints. 1 = unlimited, 7 = executive parity or
#' subordination. (-88 = transition, -77 = interregnum, -66 foreign interruption).
#' See official Polity codebook for further detail. Factor with 10 levels. Most
#' common: Unlimited Authority (4761), Intermediate Category 1/3 (925), Slight to
#' Moderate Limitations (3754), Intermediate Category 3/5 (342), Substantial
#' Limitations (1281), Intermediate Category 5/7 (700), Executive Parity or
#' Subordination (4524). NAs = 0.}
#'
#'
#' \item{polcomp}{Political competition. 1= repressed (totally closed), 2 =
#' restricted, 3 = authoritarian-guided liberalization, 4 = uninstitutionalized, 5
#' = gradual transition from uninstitutionalized, 6 = factional/restricted, 7 =
#' factional, 8 = liberalization or retrenchment, 9 = limited and/or decreasing
#' overt coercion, 10 = institutionalized electoral. (-88 = transition, -77 =
#' interregnum, -66 foreign interruption). See official Polity codebook for
#' further detail. Factor with 13 levels. Most common: Suppressed (4108),
#' Restricted (1978), Uninstitutionalized (533), Factional/Restricted (3768),
#' Factional (1018), Electoral Transition: Limited Conflict/Coercion (1110),
#' Institutionalized Electoral (2762). NAs = 126.}
#'
#'
#' \item{polity_country}{Original country name in dataset. Character with 193
#' distinct values. Most common: Afghanistan (216), Austria (216), China (216),
#' Denmark (216), France (216), Iran (216), Japan (216), Nepal (216), Oman (216),
#' Portugal (216), Spain (216), Sweden (216), Thailand (216), Turkey (216), United
#' Kingdom (216), United States (216). NAs = 0.}
#'
#'
#' \item{GWc}{Gleditsch-Ward alphabetic country code. See Gleditsch and Ward
#' (1999). Character with 186 distinct values. Most common: AFG (216), AUS (216),
#' CHN (216), DEN (216), FRN (216), IRN (216), JPN (216), NEP (216), OMA (216),
#' POR (216), RUS (216), SPN (216), SWD (216), THI (216), TUR (216), UKG (216),
#' USA (216). NAs = 0.}
#'
#'
#' \item{cown}{Correlates of War numeric country code. Differs from GWn for a few
#' country-years. See Gleditsch and Ward (1999). Numeric. Max = 950, min = 2,
#' distinct = 186, mean = 402.953, sd = 249.456, NAs = 0.}
#'
#'
#' \item{polity_ccode}{Country code in Polity datasets. Differs from GWn for a few
#' country-years. See Gleditsch and Ward (1999). Numeric. Max = 950, min = 2,
#' distinct = 194, mean = 402.905, sd = 249.446, NAs = 0.}
#'
#'
#' \item{region}{Region. Character with 20 distinct values. Most common: South
#' America (2017), Southern Europe (1467), Western Europe (1662). NAs = 0.}
#'
#'
#' \item{continent}{Continent. Character with 5 distinct values. Most common:
#' Americas (4182), Asia (4079), Europe (5269). NAs = 0.}
#'
#'
#' \item{GW_startdate}{Date at which the state entered the system of states
#' according to Gleditsch and Ward, or NA if it has never been a member. Date. Max
#' = 2011-07-09, min = 1816-01-01, distinct = 142, NAs = 0.}
#'
#'
#' \item{GW_enddate}{Date at which the state ceased to be a member of the system
#' of states according to Gleditsch and Ward, or NA if it still exists. Date. Max
#' = 2006-06-04, min = 1830-09-22, distinct = 19, NAs = 15461.}
#'
#'
#' \item{microstate}{Indicator of whether the state is a microstate, according to
#' Gleditsch's list of microstates. Logical. TRUE = 0, FALSE = 17053, NAs = 0.}
#'
#'
#' \item{lat}{Latitude. Numeric. Max = 61.924, min = -40.901, distinct = 183, mean
#' = 22.351, sd = 25.654, NAs = 0.}
#'
#'
#' \item{lon}{Longitude. Numeric. Max = 178.065, min = -121.869, distinct = 183,
#' mean = 9.435, sd = 65.115, NAs = 0.}
#'
#'
#' \item{in_cow}{Whether the country-year is in the Correlates of War system of
#' states. Logical. TRUE = 16904, FALSE = 149, NAs = 0.}
#'
#'
#' \item{in_system}{Whether the country-year is in the Gleditsch-Ward system of
#' states. See Gleditsch and Ward (1999). Logical. TRUE = 16155, FALSE = 898, NAs
#' = 0.}
#'
#'
#' }
#'
#'
#'
#' @references
#'
#' See Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, Keith Jaggers, 2014. POLITY IV PROJECT:
#' Dataset Users' Manual. Center for Systemic Peace.
#'
#'
#'
#'
#' @family democracy
#'
#' @family regime characteristics
"polity_annual"