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matchingMarkets: Analysis of Stable Matchings
Implements structural estimators to correct for the sample selection bias from observed outcomes in matching markets. This includes one-sided matching of agents into groups as well as two-sided matching of students to schools. The package also contains algorithms to find stable matchings in the three most common matching problems: the stable roommates problem, the college admissions problem, and the house allocation problem.
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Package details |
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| Author | Thilo Klein |
| Maintainer | Thilo Klein <thilo@klein.uk> |
| License | GPL (>= 2) | file LICENSE |
| Version | 0.3-4 |
| URL | http://matchingMarkets.org http://klein.uk |
| Package repository | View on R-Forge |
| Installation |
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