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Implements structural estimators to correct for the sample selection bias from observed outcomes in matching markets. This includes onesided matching of agents into groups as well as twosided matching of students to schools. The package also contains algorithms to find stable matchings in the three most common matching problems: the stable roommates problem, the college admissions problem, and the house allocation problem.
Package details 


Author  Thilo Klein 
Date of publication  20170326 12:32:46 
Maintainer  Thilo Klein <thilo@klein.uk> 
License  GPL (>= 2)  file LICENSE 
Version  0.33 
URL  http://matchingMarkets.org http://klein.uk 
Package repository  View on RForge 
Installation 
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