Description Usage Arguments Value Author(s) References Examples

Finds all stable matchings (if one exists) in the stable roommates problem with incomplete lists using the Prosser (2014) constraint encoding based on either given or randomly generated preferences.

1 |

`prefs` |
valuation matrix of dimension |

`nAgents` |
integer that gives the number of players in the market. |

`seed` |
integer setting the state for random number generation. |

`p.range` |
range of two intergers |

`sri`

returns a list with the following items.

`prefs` |
agents' preference list. |

`matching` |
edgelist of matched pairs, inculding the number of the match ( |

Thilo Klein

Gusfield, D.M. and R.W. Irving (1989). The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms, MIT Press.

Prosser, P. (2014). Stable Roommates and Constraint Programming. *Lecture Notes in Computer Science, CPAIOR 2014 Edition*.
Springer International Publishing, 8451: 15–28.

Irving, R.W. and S. Scott (2007). The stable fixtures problem: A many-to-many extension of stable roommates.
*Discrete Applied Mathematics*, 155: 2118–2129.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | ```
## Roommate problem with 10 players, given preferences:
prefs <- matrix(rep(1:10, 10), 10, 10)
sri(prefs=prefs)
## Roommate problem with 10 players, random preferences:
sri(nAgents=10, seed=1)
## Roommate problem with no equilibrium matching:
sri(nAgents=10, seed=2)
## Roommate problem with 3 equilibria:
sri(nAgents=10, seed=3)
``` |

matchingMarkets documentation built on May 31, 2017, 1:33 a.m.

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