Description Usage Arguments Value Minimum required arguments Author(s) References Examples

Finds *all* stable matchings in either the
hospital/residents problem (a.k.a. college
admissions problem) or the related
stable marriage problem.
Dependent on the problem, the results comprise the student and college-optimal or
the men and women-optimal matchings. The implementation allows for *incomplete preference
lists* (some agents find certain agents unacceptable) and *unbalanced instances* (unequal
number of agents on both sides). The function uses the Prosser (2014) constraint encoding based on
either given or randomly generated preferences.

1 2 3 |

`nStudents` |
integer indicating the number of students (in the college admissions problem)
or men (in the stable marriage problem) in the market. Defaults to |

`nColleges` |
integer indicating the number of colleges (in the college admissions problem)
or women (in the stable marriage problem) in the market. Defaults to |

`nSlots` |
vector of length |

`s.prefs` |
matrix of dimension |

`c.prefs` |
matrix of dimension |

`seed` |
integer setting the state for random number generation. |

`s.range` |
range of two intergers |

`c.range` |
range of two intergers |

`...` |
. |

`hri`

returns a list of the following elements.

`s.prefs.smi` |
student-side preference matrix for the stable marriage problem with incomplete lists (SMI). |

`c.prefs.smi` |
college-side preference matrix for the stable marriage problem with incomplete lists (SMI). |

`s.prefs.hri` |
student-side preference matrix for the college admissions problem (a.k.a. hospital/residents problem) with incomplete lists (HRI). |

`c.prefs.hri` |
college-side preference matrix for the college admissions problem (a.k.a. hospital/residents problem) with incomplete lists (HRI). |

`matchings` |
edgelist of matched students and colleges, inculding the number of the match
( |

.

`hri`

requires the following combination of arguments, subject to the matching problem.

`nStudents, nColleges`

Marriage problem with random preferences.

`s.prefs, c.prefs`

Marriage problem with given preferences.

`nStudents, nSlots`

College admissions problem with random preferences.

`s.prefs, c.prefs, nSlots`

College admissions problem with given preferences.

Thilo Klein

Gale, D. and L.S. Shapley (1962). College admissions and the stability
of marriage. *The American Mathematical Monthly*, 69(1):9–15.

Morizumi, Y., T. Hayashi and Y. Ishida (2011). A network visualization of stable matching in the stable
marriage problem. *Artificial Life Robotics*, 16:40–43.

Prosser, P. (2014). Stable Roommates and Constraint Programming. *Lecture Notes in Computer Science, CPAIOR 2014 Edition*.
Springer International Publishing, 8451: 15–28.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 | ```
## -----------------------
## --- Marriage problem
## 3 men, 2 women, random preferences:
hri(nStudents=7, nColleges=6, seed=4)
## 3 men, 2 women, given preferences:
s.prefs <- matrix(c(1,2, 1,2, 1,2), 2,3)
c.prefs <- matrix(c(1,2,3, 1,2,3), 3,2)
hri(s.prefs=s.prefs, c.prefs=c.prefs)
## --------------------------------
## --- College admission problem
## 7 students, 2 colleges with 3 slots each, random preferences:
hri(nStudents=7, nSlots=c(3,3), seed=21)
## 7 students, 2 colleges with 3 slots each, given preferences:
s.prefs <- matrix(c(1,2, 1,2, 1,NA, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2), 2,7)
c.prefs <- matrix(c(1,2,3,4,5,6,7, 1,2,3,4,5,NA,NA), 7,2)
hri(s.prefs=s.prefs, c.prefs=c.prefs, nSlots=c(3,3))
## 7 students, 3 colleges with 3 slots each, incomplete preferences:
hri(nStudents=7, nSlots=c(3,3,3), seed=21, s.range=c(1,3))
## --------------------
## --- Summary plots
## Not run:
## 200 students, 200 colleges with 1 slot each
res <- hri(nStudents=200, nColleges=200, seed=12)
plot(res)
plot(res, energy=TRUE)
## End(Not run)
``` |

Embedding an R snippet on your website

Add the following code to your website.

For more information on customizing the embed code, read Embedding Snippets.